In the August/September 2017 issue of Aviation Security International, an article appeared on the need to develop secure supply chains for air cargo security, citing, amongst other examples, the foiled Yemen bomb plot. The article highlighted the significant limitations of cargo security screening, pushed for more of a focus on supply chains, and asked whether the air cargo industry could develop an appetite for innovation. Now, on the 10th anniversary of the Yemen printer cartridge bomb plot, the author of that article, Shannon Wandmaker, looks back at the event, considers how the aviation industry and government responded, and what the future may hold for cargo security.
In the August/September 2017 issue of Aviation Security International, an article appeared on the need to develop secure supply chains for air cargo security, citing, amongst other examples, the foiled Yemen bomb plot. The article highlighted the significant limitations of cargo security screening, pushed for more of a focus on supply chains, and asked whether the air cargo industry could develop an appetite for innovation. Now, on the 10th anniversary of the Yemen printer cartridge bomb plot, the author of that article, Shannon Wandmaker, looks back at the event, considers how the aviation industry and government responded, and what the future may hold for cargo security.
On 29 October 2010 two packages, each containing a sophisticated and viable improvised explosive device (IED) disguised in a toner cartridge, were discovered on separate UPS and FedEx cargo planes; one in Dubai, and one at East Midlands Airport in the UK.
The IEDs were contained in packages addressed to former synagogues in Chicago, and both devices were timed to detonate mid-air, with the suspected intention of destroying the aircraft over the US.
warned the U.S. of the bomb plot
By the time they were discovered, the device in Dubai had been on two Qatar Airways passenger aircraft and a FedEx Express plane, and the device in the UK had flown on one passenger and two cargo aircraft.
The IED found in the UK contained 400 grams of PETN and the one in Dubai 300 grams. Studies have shown that just 6 grams of PETN – around 2% of what was used – would have been enough to blow a hole in an aircraft’s skin, and that the results of either of the IEDs detonating mid-air would have been catastrophic.
“…around 03:00 on 29 October, British military and police explosives experts subjected the package and the printer that contained the toner cartridge IED to X-ray, ETD and EDD screening. No explosives were detected, and the package was given the all clear at 10:00…”
What was particularly concerning about the plot and the devices was how artfully they were concealed.
The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Interior (MoI) had provided intelligence to the US the day before that included package tracking numbers and destinations, and alerted them to the fact the bombs would be in toner cartridges. However, even with this information, the bomb that arrived in the UK was almost missed.
Around 03:00 on 29 October, British military and police explosives experts subjected the package and the printer that contained the toner cartridge IED to X-ray, explosive trace detection (ETD) and explosive detection dog (EDD) screening. No explosives were detected, and the package was given the all clear at 10:00.
However, US authorities insisted the package be inspected again. British authorities consulted with officials in Dubai who, by this stage, had already discovered the other IED, and MI6 spoke with the Saudi MoI. The IED was eventually discovered at around 14:00, more than 10 hours after the package was first identified.
Little wonder then that even though both devices went through X-ray screening in Sana’a they were not discovered.
Indeed, the German Federal Criminal Police Office, in reviewing the X-ray images taken of the bomb discovered in Dubai, noted the PETN resembled the printer cartridges powdered ink, and the timers resembled normal printer cartridge electronics, and that accordingly the devices would have been all but impossible to detect on X-ray.
Immediate Aftermath
Cargo security had always been the neglected stepchild of the aviation security industry, and nowhere was this more obvious than in the immediate aftermath of the foiled plot. Senior politicians demonstrated a sometimes spectacular lack of understanding of how air cargo travels.
With this in mind, the subsequent weeks went exactly as one would expect. The European Union (EU), Australia, Canada, the US and others, and even close neighbours like the UAE moved quickly to ban all air cargo out of Yemen, with predictable results on Yemen’s export industry and already damaged economy.
In addition, countries also moved to ban cargo from other countries that were suddenly recognised as having little to no cargo security in place, including Bangladesh, Egypt, Somalia, and Syria, though the list varied by country and region.
“Yemen is not a natural provider of office supplies to…the Chicago area. Therefore, you might fondly imagine that the staff in the parcels’ offices in the capital, Sana’a, might have checked the despatches more closely before allowing them anywhere near an aircraft, cargo or passengers. But they didn’t.” Simon Calder
It would have been easy at this point to assume that, as in the past, concerns about cargo security would once again get pushed back into the shadows, and the aviation security world would go on as before. However, this time governments and industry woke up to the fact that a threat to cargo security was a threat to all aviation, and cargo security had gaps in it literally large enough to put printer-sized bombs through.
The Next 10 Years
As I noted in my 2017 article, the reliance on X-ray screening of cargo placed two conflicting pressures – security and facilitation – on a weak link in the cargo supply chain: the screeners. In cargo facilities all across the world, hundreds of tonnes of cargo stack up at the entrance, and screeners are basically told, “Screen this cargo before the flights depart or else”. Under these circumstances, it’s reasonable to appreciate that a security officer, barely earning a living wage, will be more concerned about processing the cargo into the facility than screening it correctly.
The Yemen cargo incident was a perfect example of the failure this kind of pressure leads to. Both printers went through screening, but no-one had the time or presence of mind to think, “Why would someone spend $450 to send a $150 printer to the US? What’s wrong with the address? Why is this box so beaten up? Let’s take it off-line and look a little closer.”
When you’re a screener being told, “Process 400 tonnes of cargo a day or we’ll find someone who can”, you end up thinking, “Well, it looks like a printer, and the manifest says ‘printer’, so…”
As Simon Calder, the English travel writer and broadcaster, observed in The Independent newspaper on 6 November 2010, “Yemen is not a natural provider of office supplies to…the Chicago area. Therefore, you might fondly imagine that the staff in the parcels’ offices in the capital, Sana’a, might have checked the despatches more closely before allowing them anywhere near an aircraft, cargo or passengers. But they didn’t.”
The Yemen plot drove recognition from regulators and industry that securing air cargo upstream in the supply chain, and then protecting it from interference until it’s loaded onto an aircraft, moves a significant percentage of cargo out of the airport screening process, eases screening choke points at airports, and allows screeners more time to focus on suspicious items, high-risk cargo, and cargo that comes from unknown shippers.
As part of this focus on upstream and the supply chain, in 2011 the European Commission (EC) moved to establish its Air Cargo or Mail Carrier operating into the Union from a Third Country Airport (ACC3) programme. This programme sought to ensure all cargo flying into the EU had either been screened according to EU standards, or had come from an EU validated secure supply chain. A discussion about the effectiveness of ACC3 is an argument for another time; however, the existence ACC3 highlighted the importance air cargo security was now being given.
At the same time the World Customs Organization (WCO) responded to the plot by establishing a Technical Experts Group on Air Cargo Security (TEGACS) that included customs administrations, civil aviation authorities, intergovernmental organisations and the private sector. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) established a similar Working Group on Air Cargo Security (WGACS).
A particular focus of these groups was the use of pre-loading rather than pre-arrival cargo information for risk analysis.
In 2014 the WCO and ICAO formed a Joint Working Group on Advanced Cargo Information (JWGACI) that, inter alia, looked at the results of three advanced cargo information system trials then being undertaken in the US, EU and Canada, and developed a set of harmonised global standards for such advanced data systems. These standards became known as Pre-Loading Advanced Cargo Information (PLACI).
In February 2017 TEGACS agreed that the risk to air cargo security highlighted by the Yemen incident was still present, and PLACI was a valuable additional layer in the detection of suspect shipments.
In May 2016 the EU introduced legislation requiring the submission of PLACI with implementation expected by 2020, the US made their Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) programme mandatory in 2018, and Canada continues to implement and refine their Pre-load Air Cargo Targeting (PACT) programme.
On the screening equipment side of the equation, advances in technology meant the pure window dressing of X-ray cargo screening in the past began to morph into a useful screening regime as more sophisticated screening technology emerged.
There was also a move to incorporate other cargo screening methods, including explosive detection dogs (EDD), explosive trace detection (ETD), and other alternatives to traditional X-ray. Additionally, standards were developed in relation to the deployment of this technology and, in relation to EDD, the training and ongoing testing of the dogs.
Actions for the Future
On the regulatory side of the house, the future continues to move towards phasing out unvalidated known and account consignors and the implementation of 100% screening in some form, including piece level screening. The implementation of this level of 100% screening has made the adoption of secure supply chains using a regulated air cargo agent all the more important to ensure air cargo continues to be facilitated.
With new screening technologies a requirement, 100% screening does now provide some value. Provided, of course, it is used in coordination with supply chain security.
Future technology innovations include higher-powered computed tomography (CT) systems that allow for better cargo screening, explosive vapour detection (EVD) technology, as well as mass spectrometry rather than traditional ETD, which are already in the field and look promising for cargo screening.
In addition, the use of EDD continues to be developed and refined, and is becoming more widely accepted.
Organisations like the International Air Transport Association (IATA) have noted in white papers that in the future, cargo will be secured upstream with a combination of technology and data, and posits that information gained through screening will be used to automatically validate shipment documentation; all very positive, and all achievable with the technology and systems already available today.
However, the cargo industry is not innovative by nature. More than 30 years after the internet became available to the public, in an age when people can buy anything from anywhere with a click of their phone, the cargo industry still uses paper documentation, and it still take eight days to deliver goods at a time when there is almost nowhere on earth a person couldn’t deliver themselves in 48 hours (at least pre-COVID…). In the last ten years it has shown an admirable willingness to be dragged into the 21st century, and the next ten years will require more of the same.
Through all of this, spare a thought for Yemen. Throughout these last ten years it continues to be a failed state besieged by terrorism and mired by both a civil war and a Saudi-Iran proxy war. Regardless of what Ewan McGregor would have you believe about the salmon fishing there, the country has not progressed. And while states like Yemen continue to struggle, air cargo will need to continue its evolution.
But at least for the decade since October 2010, aviation regulators, representative bodies and industry can rightfully claim to have taken meaningful air cargo security action. They have taken the greatest gift the aviation security industry can receive – a near miss – and used it as an impetus for real change.
“…advances in technology meant the pure window dressing of X-ray cargo screening in the past began to morph into a useful screening regime as more sophisticated screening technology emerged…”
Shannon Wandmaker is the director of aviation security consulting company Cain Wandmaker, and was previously the principal consultant for the G4S Kuwait Airport Aviation and Cargo Security Project. He is the former head of cargo security for IATA, and former chair of the Global Air Cargo Advisory Group (GACAG) Security Task Force, and prior to this led the aviation security audit and capacity development programme across 44 pan-European countries for ICAO/ECAC in Paris. Mr Wandmaker spent 12 years in Australian Government aviation policy, operational and diplomatic positions, including as first secretary (transport) in the Australian Embassy, Abu Dhabi, during the period of the foiled Yemeni cargo plot, and also led aviation security capacity development activities in the South Pacific and South East Asia. He can be contacted at shannon@cainwandmaker.com.