Month: October 2013

by Diana Stancu, Managing Director of Safe and Secure Skies.

The number of unruly passenger incidents making it into the news headlines is on the increase. Regardless as to whether or not such reporting is indicative of an actual increase in incidents, as opposed to ‘reported’ incidents, the issue is certainly one of considerable concern to the aviation community and, in particular, to flight crew whose lives are on the line. These incidents impact the safety and security of the aircraft, cause discomfort to fellow passengers and crew, and cause financial loss to airlines when flights have to be diverted as a result. Diana Stancu asks what legal measures are in place to deter and deal with perpetrators of unruly behaviour on board international flights, where the issue of jurisdiction can be a problem.

Passengers used to have so much respect for cabin crew and incidents of unruly behaviour were rare and due, primarily, to a fear of flying and the over consumption of alcohol or use of narcotic substances. Times have changed and the range of causal factors has increased.

According to IATA’s STEADES (Safety and Trend Evaluation, Analysis and Data Exchange System), unruly passenger behaviour increased by 54% in the period 2007 to 2011. In total, there were 6,156 unruly passenger incidents recorded for 2011, up from 5,544 such incidents recorded for 2010. For the period 2007 to 2011, 22% of all incidents were serious enough to require the intervention of police or security services at the place of landing. The data collected was provided voluntarily and even though it gives a significant sample, it does not constitute an industry-wide view of unruly behaviour on flights worldwide. After all, most airlines around the world are not even IATA members and unruly behaviour does also take place on domestic flights which, in places such as Australia, China, Russia, Canada and the US, can be as long as many international flights.
An unruly passenger is defined as a passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct on board an aircraft or refuses to follow instructions from flight and cabin crewmembers and therefore disturbs the good order and discipline on board an aircraft. Unruly or disruptive behaviour can include: verbal or physical confrontation with crewmembers or other passengers, intoxicated behaviour, the illegal consumption of narcotics, alcohol or cigarettes, refusal to comply with safety instructions, making threats that could affect the safety of the crew, passengers or aircraft, sexual abuse and harassment and other types of behaviour that could jeopardise the safety or alter the good order and discipline on board the aircraft.

These incidents are sometimes referred to the local authorities upon landing. However, when doing so, what should be an easy process is rarely as straightforward as it seems. Many crew describe difficulties in dealing with authorities at foreign airports, not to mention the differences in the definition of offences and the subsequent penalties between jurisdictions, with some unlikely to prosecute at all or only impose a lenient penalty. Moreover, authorities at the place of landing may not even have jurisdiction, thus the prosecution of the unruly passenger is not pursued at all.

The Legal Framework
The Tokyo Convention of 1963, on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, provides the legal framework for dealing with unruly behaviours on board aircraft engaged in international flights. However, this legal regime does not provide an adequate deterrent for such behaviour, mainly because jurisdiction is given to the State of registration of the aircraft and the jurisdiction for the State of landing does not exist. It is true that the identity of the unruly passenger can be easily established which, in theory, could facilitate the job of the law enforcement authorities, but this does not mean that the passenger can be prosecuted. Depending on the seriousness of the incident, the State where the aircraft lands does not have the jurisdiction to prosecute the offender if the act has been committed on board an aircraft registered in another State; hence, the perpetrator of the incident is left unpunished. The role of the State where the unruly passenger disembarks is not clearly specified in the Convention. In that regard, the Convention fails to directly address a practical reality – the necessity to appropriately deal with an unruly passenger at the point where they are handed over to the authorities on the ground.

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by Steve Wolff

The attempted bombing of cargo aircraft, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) concealed in printer cartridges, in 2010, once again demonstrated that terrorists continue to have an uncanny understanding of our critical weaknesses and grow more sophisticated in their attempts to smuggle IEDs on board commercial aircraft using different vectors. Steve Wolff looks at current and emerging technologies and explores where we are in countering the ever-evolving threats through screening.

Air cargo is an ideal terrorist target for several strategic reasons. Firstly, it leverages the fact that successful aircraft attacks have a significant impact well beyond the immediate loss of life. For example, many more people die per year from e.g. shootings in the US than were killed on 9/11, yet these individual tragedies don’t disrupt the economy, influence infrastructure spending or affect the national psyche in the same way. Secondly, for cargo, a successful attack, and especially our response to it, has the potential to severely impact the flow of commerce and hence the global economy, given that airfreight is crucial for rapid movement of goods and components in our ’just in time’ (often ’just in the nick of time’) economy. As economic disruption of the West is one of al-Qaeda’s key goals, a successful attack against air cargo (or attacks against mass transportation if they led to draconian screening methods that impacted commerce) would have a more substantial economic impact than an attack via other threat vectors, such as passengers or baggage.

Where We Are
Regulators worldwide have cooperated extensively to develop internationally recognised air cargo security strategies, including initiatives such as improving the supply chain process. Trials of SecureFreight – where shippers are ’known’ and cargo has been validated and secured upstream and maintained throughout the supply chain – are underway. IATA has been advancing its Air Cargo Advanced Screening Programme (ACAS) with the goal of global harmonisation and increased use of electronic waybills and e-cargo security declarations. This approach, which loosely amounts to ’profiling’ cargo, is another example of risk-based screening. Centralised screening facilities (CCSFs in the US), run by the private sector, provide screening to international (or regional) standards. However, there is a critical problem in dealing with ’unknown’ cargo: screening technology for cargo lags about 20 years behind systems that are available for baggage. Fortunately, this may be about to change.

Current Technologies
Today’s technological workhorses for cargo inspection have been X-ray (often just single view, low penetration systems) and trace detection. Most of the major X-ray manufacturers sell pallet-capable dual energy X-ray systems with either single or dual views as well as larger systems. Where needed, due to the inability to see inside dense objects, these have been supplemented with physical search, explosives trace detectors (ETDs) and, in some countries, the use of dogs, either via an innovative sampling, remote K9 inspection process called REST (formerly RasCargo) or using Free Range Explosive Detection Dog teams (FREDD). For certain types of non-metallic cargo containers, metal detection technologies have been considered, but obviously would be of questionable use if non-metallic chemical timer/triggering mechanisms were used as they have been by terrorists inside the aircraft cabin. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and others have explored – and permit – the use of Certified Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) but the small apertures of current EDS systems create an operational problem as cargo pallets need to be broken down for screening and reassembled afterwards, increasing processing time, cost and the potential for damage and theft.

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Whilst many readers have visited Thailand and experienced the seemingly opulent nature of Bangkok’s high rise buildings, temples and hotels, it is also impossible to walk the streets without noticing the beggars with all their deformities, the homeless children and prostitutes. In the western world, prostitution is often a choice or the result of an individual ‘going off the rails’ (whether perceived as such or not); in Thailand, on the other hand, prostitutes are victims of poverty and abuse. In July, Zoë Baum visited Thailand as part of a human trafficking awareness and prevention initiative. She now explains just why airlines must play their part in tackling modern day slavery.

Whilst Thailand is often referred to as ‘The Land of Smiles’ so many of these smiles are masks which thinly veil a multitude of stories of human suffering.

When I visited Thailand earlier this year as part of a human trafficking prevention delegation, organised by the charity JUSTIFI, I met an inspirational woman called Bonita; she had founded Home of New Beginnings. This non-profit organisation is primarily focused on rescuing young girls from the Go-Go bars in Bangkok and taking them to a safe house where they learn how to rebuild their lives and discover new ways to finance themselves. Bonita visits the bars herself, entering as if she was a customer and identifying those who she believes might be persuaded to escape the seedy world in which they have found themselves. Those girls who have the best chance of being saved are younger victims who are not yet reliant on drugs and alcohol to numb the pain of abuse and depression and therefore have to finance the purchase of such substances. Victims who are being exported overseas are less likely to be dependent on substance abuse as they are generally naive and believe that they are travelling for legitimate employment.

It is important to note that these young girls are not persuaded over night. Bonita, with time on her hands and a charitable mission in life, builds a relationship with the prostitutes in order to gain their trust and slowly convince them of alternatives. It is unfortunate that in the aviation

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by Eleena Yegorova Security Manager, International Affairs at Aeroflot Russian Airlines

12 July 2013 was a special day in the history of Russian aviation security; it marked exactly 40 years since the birth of the Russian aviation security system, when the Security Department of the Civil Aviation Ministry of the USSR was created. Eleena Yegorova takes us through the development of aviation security in Russia, from its inception in 1973 to the present day.

As is often the case in the world of aviation security, even the issuance of Executive Order № 1414, which created the Security Department was a reactive measure; the statistics for acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation (see Figure 1) in Russia illustrate a number of pre-1973 incidents. Indeed, the very first attempt to hijack an aircraft was on 25 October 1958 when two criminals at a tiny airport in Cherskiy – a town in Yakutia – attempted to seize an Antonov 2 aircraft. Between 1958 and 1970 there were a few other attempts, yet no one actually succeeded in hijacking an aircraft.

Everything changed on 15 October 1970 with the first successful hijacking of a Soviet commercial flight. 19 year old cabin attendant Nadezhda Kourchenko was killed, and two crew members and one passenger were wounded, by father and son Pranas and Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuanian nationals, who diverted Aeroflot flight 244, en-route from Batumi in Georgia to Sukhumi in Abkhaz, to Turkey with 46 passengers on board. The young stewardess did her best to stop the hijackers and was posthumously awarded with one of the highest military honours – the Order of the Red Banner. Thousands of ordinary people also paid their respects to her by sending their condolences to her mother via mail and telegraph.

Like elsewhere in the world, the creation of a specialist department to counter the threat to civil aviation was never going to guarantee secure skies. Indeed, on 18 November 1983, 7 people were killed as a result of the attempted hijacking of Aeroflot flight 6833 en route from Tbilisi to Leningrad (now St. Petersburg).

The death toll was greater still on 8 March 1988 when 9 people lost their lives. Whilst 5 of those were hijackers (members of the Ovechkins family, consisting of a mother and her 10 sons), 3 were passengers and one was flight attendant Tamara Zharkaya. 36 other passengers were wounded and the whole Tupolev-154 aircraft was destroyed as a result of the hijacking whilst en route from Irkutsk to Leningrad. Zharkaya was also posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

But the real increase in the number of hijackings happened in the transition between the Soviet and modern period of Russian history; from 9 June to 30 December 1990 there were nine successful hijackings and 23 attempts; two hijackings and 11 attempts took place in 1991; two hijackings and four attempts in 1992; and two hijackings and two attempts in 1993. Fortunately none of these incidents caused as many victims as the three aforementioned hijackings between 1970 and 1988. Nevertheless, mainly as a result of these statistics, in 1994 the Russian government issued its historical Directive № 897 ‘On Federal System of Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference’. Regardless of its age, this document is still sufficiently robust enough to act as the basic state regulation for aviation security in Russia. It was developed by the relevant specialists of the new Civil Aviation Authority of the country; in 1991, the Ministry of Transportation had inherited aviation security responsibilities from the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the USSR.

Valeriy N. Saleyev headed the Russian aviation security system from 1993 until 2000. Under his leadership, key principles, if not the entire philosophy of the system, were set out. These were not just in Directive № 897, but also in the 1997 Air Code of the Russian Federation. Unlike the Air Code of the USSR, a special chapter – Chapter XII – was totally dedicated to aviation security issues. Those principles included all previous experience of counter-terrorism activity in Russia, starting with standard airport access control protocols and featuring the same strict aircraft security measures as the previous Soviet requirements. Long before 11 September 2001, all cockpit doors of Russian-made aircraft were bulletproof and pilots were strictly prohibited from opening the doors inflight.

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The potential use of liquid explosives by terrorists has, since 2006, become an increasing concern for those tasked with protecting civil aviation. Liquid explosives are relatively easy to conceal given their close resemblance to benign liquids already carried by most passengers and some are powerful agents able to cause as much damage as military grade explosives. Amir Neeman takes us through developments in the technologies designed to detect them. The first terrorist attack using liquid explosives was in 1987 against Korean Airlines and, since then, there have been several such attacks and attempted attacks, most notably the trans-Atlantic plot of 2006 which resulted in a raft of policy changes and restrictions to carry-on baggage. However, the significant restrictions on liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) carried in carry-on bags, while necessary to address the liquid explosive threat, have come with a high price tag. They created operational inefficiencies at security screening checkpoints by lowering overall throughput and increasing false alarm and bag search rates.

They required a more labour-intensive and thus costly screening process and have worsened the passenger experience for (most) travellers. While many passengers, airlines, airports and airport vendors have adjusted to these restrictions, there remains a fundamental need to implement liquid explosive detection systems (LEDS) in order to be able to fully or partially lift these restrictions and allow for a better flow of passengers and commerce. Major aviation security regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Transportation Security Administration, the European Commission (EC) and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), Transport Canada and the Australian Department of Transport as well as organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) are more than ever working to harmonize explosive detection standards and specifically have recently announced a joint effort to coordinate the phased approach in lifting LAGs restrictions.

A Global Approach

One of the leading regulators on this topic, the EC, has outlined a pathway for the removal of LAGs restrictions in carry-on luggage. By 31 January 2014, Phase 1 of the lifting of LAGs restrictions is to be implemented whereby any traveller transferring at an EU airport, having arrived from a non-EU airport, will be able to carry duty free LAGs purchased within in the preceding 36 hours as long as they are sealed within an ICAO specification Security Tamper Evident Bag (STEB), in addition to any baby food and medicines needed for the flight. By 31 January 2015 Phase 2 will be implemented whereby passengers will be able to carry clear liquids within a clear container. Finally by January 2016 all LAGs restrictions will be lifted. Before those deadlines, airports must have deployed LEDS capable of adequately screening such LAGs. Recently ICAO has issued a statement that Australia, Canada, the United States and the EU are in the process of implementing a multi-phase technology based LAGs screening approach and intend to progressively relax LAGs restrictions at airports in their respective jurisdictions. The LAGs screening technologies to be used will meet standards agreed to between these regulators.

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by Philip Baum, Editor, Aviation Security International

Andrew Parker, Head of Britain’s MI5, recently stated in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute that, “We have seen the threat shift more to increasing numbers of smaller-scale attacks and a growing proportion of groups and individuals taking it upon themselves to commit acts of terrorism.”

His comments were made in the aftermath of the Edward Snowden ‘affair’ in which the former contractor for the US’ National Security Agency opted to disclose classified documents to The Guardian newspaper in the UK which, to the horror of those in the security services, the paper irresponsibly, in my view, opted to publish. Whilst the decision to print the exposé was justified by the paper’s management on the basis that they felt the general public had a right to know how their personal data was being utilised – the security agencies were reported to have direct access to the numerous computer systems, including those at Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Skype, Yahoo and YouTube – it had also, according to Parker, handed “the advantage to the terrorists.”

The consequences of The Guardian’s actions in making Snowden’s disclosures public are terrifying in themselves, let alone the terrorist attacks that might be wrought as a result. If sophisticated terrorist plots are less likely to be developed and orchestrated over the internet, and those engaged in terrorism opt not to use email and social media to facilitate communication, there are three primary areas of concern for those engaged in protecting civil aviation.

Firstly, the ability, as conceded by Parker, for the security services to monitor the activities of individuals suspected of being radicalised is reduced. As a result, specific actions, such as the 2006 liquid explosive plot, have a greater chance of remaining under the radar and, therefore, of succeeding. “GCHQ intelligence has played a vital role in stopping many of the terrorist plots that MI5 and the police have tackled in the past decade,” said Parker, and, such intel, has certainly been more effective in thwarting attacks against aviation than airport security processes. In the UK, between 11 September 2001 and March 2013, a disturbing 330 people were convicted of terrorism-related offences, 121 of whom were (in March) in prison, nearly three-quarters of whom were British.

Secondly, the use of passenger data to determine the degree of risk any individual might pose will naturally become less reliable if the quantity and quality of useful data available to the security agencies is compromised.

Last, but not least, if those with terroristic intent are less likely to utilise the internet to transmit sensitive information or to make purchases of goods which might be used in an attack, then the sophistication of the plots will diminish and the potential for lone wolves or splinter groups to formulate far more simplistic attacks increases. As a result, whilst we are ramping up the deployment of advanced screening technologies to detect a broader range of threat substances, those who are prepared to die for their cause are conjuring up plots which do not even require infiltration of complex improvised explosive devices (IEDs) through the checkpoint.

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