Category: Industry News

Analogic recently trialled its ConneCT™ checkpoint security system at Narita airport as part of Japan’s plans to upgrade its aviation security technology in preparation for the 2020 Summer Olympics. Over a period of several weeks, ConneCT was used to screen ‘live’ passenger carry-on bags at one of Japan’s busiest airports.

According to Analogic’s Japanese partner, Teikoku Sen-I Co., ConneCT impressed everyone with its next-generation features as well as the team’s depth of expertise in CT technology. Specifically, the team at Narita was impressed with ConneCT’s high resolution imaging and intuitive user interface.

Most of us go about our daily lives oblivious of the security measures put in place to protect us and the society we live in. We know, or at least hope, that the security services are doing their utmost to take necessary steps to guard against the next terrorist atrocity. However, when we fly we witness and experience enhanced security measures which in some respects reassure us, yet also force us to consider the degree to which our personal privacy can be invaded in the process; these measures, after all, have a serious impact on issues of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, including the rights to privacy and data protection, freedom of movement, the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In January 2017, and in light of the Executive Orders signed by newly elected President Trump limiting the travel of certain people based on their nationality or country of birth, this has become an ever more taxing issue. Olga Enerstvedt questions whether it is possible to satisfy both aviation security requirements and passengers’ civil liberty rights, or whether there is a contradiction between them.

On the one hand, states have a duty to maintain a high level of security, to adopt measures protecting persons, aircraft, airport facilities and other assets from harm. On the other hand, there are various instruments aimed at protecting human rights, and states are obliged to promote, respect, protect and fulfil them.

Balancing or Proportionality Test?
A common suggestion is to find a balance between liberty and security values. In other words, we should use the so-called ‘trade-off model’. In short, it is not possible to place greater emphasis on one of the values without detracting from the other.

However, in balancing terms, civil liberties will always be compromised. It is obvious that security, which is vital to survival, is more important than, for example, privacy, which is a social and political need but is not an immediate matter of survival. Only when security needs are satisfied is it possible to consider needs relating to civil liberties at all.

The balancing concept is subject to criticism; firstly because it justifies the compromises to civil liberties. It is suggested that, instead, the test of proportionality should be used. By using the latter, one can evaluate whether a security measure is suitable, necessary, without any less intrusive alternatives, non-excessive, and so on. Applying these criteria allows us to assess whether the human rights risks caused by this measure are proportionate to its security benefits and other factors.

Civil Liberties Risks
Unfortunately, in an article, one cannot look into civil liberties issues in aviation security in depth. Nevertheless, using the results of my previous extensive research, the risks relating to a number of emerging but increasingly used technologies – body scanners, camera surveillance (CCTV) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems – can be summarised in the table (Table 1, facing page).

In brief, to different extents, all of the indicated measures interfere with privacy and raise concerns in respect of a number of data protection principles, such as fair and lawful processing, proportionality, purpose limitation, minimality, and data subject influence.

The right to freedom of movement may suffer as well, in particular with regard to PNR and smart CCTV, if innocent persons are mistakenly stopped, searched and detained, mainly as the result of mistaken inclusion on various watch lists, inaccuracy of facial recognition and behavioural analysis techniques.

All the measures raise concerns with respect to the right to non-discrimination. Body scanners may discriminate against ‘abnormal’ persons and may be used discriminatively if a person is selected by security officers to go through the device or automatically chosen due to specific characteristics. In the case of CCTV, some people are over-scrutinised by either human security staff or by automatic tools. The use of PNR may also involve the use of sensitive data and profiling, which is discriminative by nature.

With regard to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, all the measures can have a negative impact indirectly, mainly via religion as a criterion for discrimination. Additionally, if smart CCTV detects movements that are quite neutral but are linked to practising a specific faith, but which are deemed suspicious, this can discriminate and disproportionally affect the right to privacy of a specific group of persons.

The threat posed by so-called ‘foreign fighters’ has intensified over the last few years. Dr John Harrison attempts to place the complex issue in context and offer some ways in which the international civil aviation system can play a role in addressing the threat.

One of the defining characteristics of the al-Qa’eda (AQ) and Da’esh (the author will use the Arabic acronym for so-called Islamic State) has been the ability of both groups to attract, and train individuals globally to come and fight for their cause. Al-Qa’eda, for example, is thought by some to have processed as many as 100,000 people in its camps between 1996 and 2001, albeit the figure most likely stands between 10-20,000. Similarly, Da’esh has been able to attract foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Libya. According to the United Nations 360,000 have entered Syria since 2011, and while around 30,000 remain, tens of thousands have either died or otherwise departed. Some, as demonstrated by the attacks in Europe since 2014, are returning to their home countries with their extremist ideology intact.

The Threat in Context
Since the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency in 2004, the concept of the foreign fighter has been gaining wider traction. Experts understand the term to mean individuals who leave their country of origin or residence to join a non-state armed group fighting abroad. The typical profile of a fighter is a male between 18 and 30 who is either ideologically motivated -(usually a radical and distorted understanding of Sunni Islam), looking for meaning in their lives, or simply seeking adventure. While many are paid better than local fighters, money does not seem to be their primary motivation, so they are not considered mercenaries.

The phenomenon is of course not new; 35,000 so-called ‘Afghan Arabs’ – Muslims from 43 different countries – fought against the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) almost 60,000 foreigners fought, primarily for the Republicans. Perhaps most famously, Lord Byron and other English foreign fighters went off to fight in the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s. What defines the current wave of fighters – including those who participated in the Soviet War in Afghanistan – is that some have remained active combatants, travelling from the Balkans to Chechnya, to Algeria to Yemen throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, and are increasingly returning to their homeland and countries of residence.

The Two Foreign Fighter Threats
The international focus on the foreign fighter phenomenon has, understandably, fixated on those fighters aligned with Da’esh and other anti-Syria regime combatants (predominantly Sunni Muslims). As a consequence, a smaller but strategically important group has been overlooked: the pro-regime Shi’a fighters – the Syrian regime comes from the Alawites, a Shi’a group. Iran – a Shi’a majority state that backs the regime – has recruited 20,000 Afghan Shi’a, and an unknown number of Pakistani Shi’a to fight as part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces in Syria. Additionally, Iran has used its air force, the state carrier Iran Air, and private carriers Yas and Mahan Air to help move combatants. The latter two have been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council for transporting equipment and personnel to fight for the Syria regime. The air route between Iran and Syria is the most critical supply corridor as the land routes through Iraq are currently controlled by Da’esh and Iran does not have sea-lift capabilities.

These Shi’a fighters are perhaps more of a strategic threat than Da’esh; when these trained and experienced fighters return to Afghanistan, or Pakistan, they may serve as a catalyst for further sectarian violence in these countries, which already face deepening sectarian divides. But unlike Da’esh, Iran will have a greater ability to direct and support and even control these groups to advance its strategic interests.

It is important to note that al-Qa’eda has not ceded the field to Da’esh. Not only is it now aligned to two other groups, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly known as Jabat al Nursa) and Ahrar al-Sham, but AQ has also sent a special unit, identified by the US as the Khorasan Group, to conduct mass casualty attacks in Europe including aviation targets. US airstrikes in Syria in September of 2014 are understood to have disrupted the group.

That said, the recent Da’esh-linked attacks in Paris, Brussels, Berlin and elsewhere have demonstrated that the threat posed by these fighters to the rest of the world, and the aviation industry in particular, is no longer theoretical.

by Philip Baum

When EgyptAir flight MS804 crashed on 19 May last year, whilst en route from Paris to Cairo, speculation was rife that the disaster had been caused by a terrorist bomb. After all, modern aeroplanes don’t just fall out of the sky and, considering that both Egypt and France were at the time, and continue to be, in the crosshairs of terrorist actions, it seemed to be the logical assumption. Yet, with an absence of proof, evidence of a fire on board (albeit cause unknown), and the French authorities keen for one of their gateway airports not to be the point of loading of the latest explosive charge, the security story was kept at bay.

At bay, that is, until just before Christmas. On 15th December, the Central Directorate of Aircraft Accident Investigation at the Egyptian Ministry of Civil Aviation received the forensic report relating to the victims’ remains; it finally confirmed that explosive residue had been found on the bodies of the victims of the disaster. “The Egyptian Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee has transferred the case to the Egyptian Prosecution Bureau for further investigation” and another passenger jet has seemingly succumbed to a terrorist act.

The news was not new. In September, Le Figaro had reported that bodies had been found to have traces of TNT on them, but this week’s announcement was the first official confirmation.

Aside from ISIS, the only entity that benefits from this latest development is Airbus; flying continues to be safe, if not secure, and the manufacturer of the jet was not at fault. For Egypt, desperately trying to resurrect its tourism industry in the aftermath of the October 2015 Metrojet bombing over the Sinai, and the subsequent cancellation of almost all European and Russian charter operations to Sharm el-Sheikh, the news could not be worse. The message, exacerbated by suicide bombing of the el-Botroseya Coptic church in Cairo on 11th December, which killed 25 people and injured dozens of others, and the 9th December bombing near the Pyramids in Giza, which killed seven people, simply illustrated that Egypt is a prime target for ISIS; the group has claimed responsibility for both the Metrojet and Botroseya church attacks as part of their “war against apostates”.

France has, perhaps, benefited from the delayed confirmation of the presence of explosive residue. The story has lost its momentum and, in any case, whilst the doomed flight did depart from Charles de Gaulle, there is absolutely no evidence that the bomb was loaded there; the aircraft had stopped at a number of other airports where the device could have been infiltrated on board. That said, it was as recently as December 2015 that 70 employees at the French capital’s airports had their security passes revoked in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks. A decade ago, another 72 Muslim male staff found themselves unable to continue in their employment at Charles de Gaulle airport as they were deemed, by the Anti-terrorist Co-ordination Unit (UCLAT), to represent a vulnerability or danger. The insider threat has, for some time, been deemed to be a real concern in France.

It is highly unlikely that any airlines are going to cease operations to Charles de Gaulle as a result of the loss of MS804, and no European government will put in place the sanctions they did against Egypt after the loss of the Metrojet flight. Such is the nature of international politics and economics. Whilst Egypt has been forced to clean up its act, and its economy suffered hugely as a result, the number of people going through Charles de Gaulle over the Christmas holiday period was similar to previous years.

But France, and other European states, face an even greater challenge than their Egyptian counterparts. Behind the scenes, there will be considerable pressure to aggressively address the insider threat. All staff will be treated with a degree of suspicion and, like it or not, it will be Muslim employees who will bear the brunt of the clamp down. Those who previously had their passes rescinded have claimed that they were questioned about their degree of religious observance and, for those who were brought up overseas, the schools they had attended. More overtly orthodox employees were reported by their peers more frequently as behaving suspiciously. We cannot, however, allow religious sensitivities to stand in the way of effective security protocols. If the insider threat is alive and well – and it is – our key defence is to better profile our fellow workmates. If that is the route we wish to go down, then we need to better educate them not to make ignorant decisions based on racial or religious stereotypes.

Screening staff, and their belongings, is also essential; the events of the last 16 months have demonstrated that bombs are more likely to make it onto aircraft through the actions of an insider than by a passenger. The technological advances, and the associated deterrent effect, need to have the same security impact on staff as they do on passengers. And, yet again, I call on the United States not to wait for a terrorist attack perpetrated by an industry insider before it introduces measures to mitigate that vulnerability; demand staff be screened now.

For years the aviation security industry has worked towards an idealised standard of security whereby passengers are only ever screened once at the onset of their journey, regardless of the number of transit stops. However, in the current climate, the concept of one-stop security is not only looking to be less achievable but also less desirable. Shannon Wandmaker discusses the reasons why this is so and, more positively, examines what is achievable to make the screening process more palatable to the travelling public, whilst also enhancing their protection.

In 47 years’ time, after teleportation makes the aviation industry redundant, or advances in virtual reality make travel unnecessary, some diligent Bachelor of History major is going to write a paper titled, ‘One-stop: the disconnect between idealism and reality in aviation security’. For the seven people who read it, the paper will come to an unremarkable and entirely predictable conclusion: one-stop aviation security never happened. Indeed, it never even came close to happening. Like poverty eradication and world peace, ‘one-stop security’ is more a rallying cry than an achievable goal, and for all the talk of harmonisation, mutual recognition and equivalence, very little progress is ever made.

It’s worth asking not only why this is, but also exploring whether one-stop security should even be the goal or whether there are better ways to improve aviation security outcomes and the passenger experience.

The idea of a seamless passenger experience – where the travelling public proceeds through security only at the start of the journey, and is not subjected to transit or transfer screening – has been around since the installation of the second walk-through metal detector. Yet in many ways, the world is further away from one-stop aviation security than ever before.

One reason is that one-stop goes against a fundamental building block of aviation security: the layered approach.

Like almost all critical processes in aviation, healthcare, engineering and other industries, redundancies are built into aviation security to ensure that, as much as possible, when something is missed there is an opportunity to rectify the mistake. Any transit screening point officer can give daily examples of prohibited items they have discovered on previously screened and cleared passengers.

The current passenger screening process is clumsy and antiquated. Layers of the existing process need to be updated or removed, and risk-based measures rather than a one size fits all approach should be implemented. Nevertheless, even the current methods of screening transit passengers still provide an opportunity to identify threats to the aviation network that have been missed on the first pass.

The fact that countries have different screening capabilities also provides a significant barrier to one-stop security, as highlighted by transit screeners routinely confiscating prohibited items.

How do we differentiate between an evacuation and an escape? Airports have long had evacuation plans for a variety of circumstances, from natural disasters to fire alarms and from significant weather events to security breaches. But lately the industry has had to come to terms with a new type of evacuation, one that is entirely different to the others: the chaotic, terrifying, run-for-your life escape. When a shooting starts, self-preservation instincts kick in and it’s about getting away from the gunfire by any means possible. But how can an airport effectively handle these most challenging types of evacuations? In the aftermath of the Fort Lauderdale attack, Jeffrey C. Price and Lori Beckman urge security personnel to plan for the worst, and examine the most common issues experienced by airports whose passengers and employees are forced to run for their lives.

Airports have seen an increase in attacks in the past few years. In the past four years, there has been an attack by a lone gunman at the Los Angeles International Airport, which killed a transportation security agent; suicide bombers at Brussels Airport; an active shooter team turned suicide bombers at the Istanbul Ataturk Airport, and the most recent, 6 January 2017, lone gunman attack in Florida at Ft. Lauderdale International Airport, which killed five people and wounded two others, to note just a few. When the shooting starts most people will instinctively bolt out any door or down any passageway in order to escape the murderous gunfire and explosions.

During this type of self-directed evacuation, people are likely to be pushed, shoved or trampled causing additional damage to property, injuries and possibly even fatalities. Additionally, emergency evacuations can cause upwards of half a million dollars of lost revenue with flight cancellations and delays, and potential lawsuits after the fact. Plus, the unplanned delays can delay and/or cause the cancellation of flights throughout the world. Airport operators will also be judged in the court of public opinion as the media will not only investigate the airport’s response, but also the ability of the airport to properly handle the evacuation and eventual repopulation of the terminal building. Despite the chaos and the confusion airports still have a responsibility to help manage the evacuation of the rest of the airport, and to get the airport open and operational as soon as possible. Many airports have taken actions ahead of time that may help save lives during the escape, and during the subsequent evacuations and repopulation of the terminal.

In taking protective actions, airport personnel have to make a variety of decisions, the most important of which is whether to actually evacuate or shelter-in-place. During weather events or natural disasters where putting people outdoors may actually place them at greater risk, the decision is typically made to shelter-in-place until the hazardous condition has passed. However, airports must be prepared to host hundreds or possibly thousands of people for a long period of time, hours and in some cases, several days. If keeping people inside the airport could result in their being in more danger then an evacuation is the preferred course of action. During an active shooter or airport assault, it’s possible that some people should shelter-in-place, while others need to be evacuated. Adding to this challenge is that these decisions need to be made very quickly, and decision-makers may not have all the information they need in order to make the decision.

The decision to shelter-in-place puts the airport operator in the position of hotelier. Even in a short-term situation – such as a passing thunderstorm or tornado – airports must have an effective method of notifying the airport population of the hazard, and have safe areas clearly marked and accessible by all passengers and personnel. For longer term sheltering, the airport should be prepared with additional food stores, blankets, cots, and medical supplies, as many passengers ignore the advice to keep medicines with them and will have checked their medicines in their hold baggage. Some passengers may have medicines that require refrigeration after a period of time.

Most of us go about our daily lives oblivious of the security measures put in place to protect us and the society we live in. We know, or at least hope, that the security services are doing their utmost to take necessary steps to guard against the next terrorist atrocity. However, when we fly we witness and experience enhanced security measures which in some respects reassure us, yet also force us to consider the degree to which our personal privacy can be invaded in the process; these measures, after all, have a serious impact on issues of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, including the rights to privacy and data protection, freedom of movement, the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In January 2017, and in light of the Executive Orders signed by newly elected President Trump limiting the travel of certain people based on their nationality or country of birth, this has become an ever more taxing issue. Olga Enerstvedt questions whether it is possible to satisfy both aviation security requirements and passengers’ civil liberty rights, or whether there is a contradiction between them.

On the one hand, states have a duty to maintain a high level of security, to adopt measures protecting persons, aircraft, airport facilities and other assets from harm. On the other hand, there are various instruments aimed at protecting human rights, and states are obliged to promote, respect, protect and fulfil them.

Balancing or Proportionality Test?
A common suggestion is to find a balance between liberty and security values. In other words, we should use the so-called ‘trade-off model’. In short, it is not possible to place greater emphasis on one of the values without detracting from the other.
However, in balancing terms, civil liberties will always be compromised. It is obvious that security, which is vital to survival, is more important than, for example, privacy, which is a social and political need but is not an immediate matter of survival. Only when security needs are satisfied is it possible to consider needs relating to civil liberties at all.

The balancing concept is subject to criticism; firstly because it justifies the compromises to civil liberties. It is suggested that, instead, the test of proportionality should be used. By using the latter, one can evaluate whether a security measure is suitable, necessary, without any less intrusive alternatives, non-excessive, and so on. Applying these criteria allows us to assess whether the human rights risks caused by this measure are proportionate to its security benefits and other factors.

Civil Liberties Risks
Unfortunately, in an article, one cannot look into civil liberties issues in aviation security in depth. Nevertheless, using the results of my previous extensive research, the risks relating to a number of emerging but increasingly used technologies – body scanners, camera surveillance (CCTV) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems – can be summarised in the table (Table 1, facing page).

In brief, to different extents, all of the indicated measures interfere with privacy and raise concerns in respect of a number of data protection principles, such as fair and lawful processing, proportionality, purpose limitation, minimality, and data subject influence.

On 11th September 2001, 19 hijackers changed the world and the way we view aviation security…but not, seemingly, the way threat is assessed. 15 of them were from Saudi Arabia, two were from the United Arab Emirates, and one each from Egypt and Lebanon. In the other major attacks against American aviation interests, Richard Reid – the shoebomber – was British, and Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab – the underpants bomber – was Nigerian. According to New America, “Of the twelve lethal jihadist terrorists in the United States since 9/11: three are African-Americans, three are from families that hailed originally from Pakistan, one is from a family that came from the Palestinian Territories, two came from Russia as children, one emigrated from Egypt and conducted his attack a decade after coming to the United States, and one each had families that originally came from Kuwait and Afghanistan”. And yet Donald Trump signs an Executive Order implying that the nationals of Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen are our primary concern.

But it is another attack on the soil of a US airport that I wish to focus on. That of 6th January this year when Santiago-Ruiz – a US citizen, born in New Jersey and Iraq War combat veteran – flew into Fort Lauderdale, claimed his suitcase at the baggage carousel, entered the toilets, loaded a Walther PPS 9mm semi-automatic, and then walked back into the arrivals area only to start shooting, randomly killing five people and injuring in excess of 40 others (eight of whom as a result of bullet wounds, the rest from the ensuing chaos). This was, however, not a failure of the aviation security system.

The fact that Santiago-Ruiz had left his temporary residence at the Qupqugiaq Inn in Anchorage, made his way to the airport and boarded a Delta flight to Minneapolis, with onward connection to Fort Lauderdale, with a gun in his bag is almost irrelevant. He could just as easily have been a resident of Florida, made his way to the airport and carried out the same atrocity without even boarding an aircraft.

There are a multitude of reasons why individuals should, with the correct paperwork in place, be able to check guns onto a flight within their hold baggage: to participate in sports events, to hunt, as members of law enforcement, for use as theatrical props and as part of historical collections to name a few. That is a globally accepted practice. In order to do so, bearers of such weaponry need to bring them to the airport at the point of departure and collect them on arrival. We could insist that firearms are always shipped and never brought to the airport terminal, but, as with so many other security protocols, it’s the good people who suffer the resulting inconvenience and the target simply moves to the shipper’s facilities.

Questionable, however, was Santiago-Ruiz’s ability to carry a firearm anywhere, let alone at an airport. After all, yes, the innocent victims of this atrocity happened to be in Terminal 2 at Fort Lauderdale International Airport, but, equally, those who died could have been in a shopping mall, theatre district, visiting a sports event or at a tourist attraction. This January’s attack happened in the public area of the airport – and there will always be a line that delineates the start and end of a security-restricted zone.

In September 2016, delegates from across the Europe gathered in Bucharest to attend the closing conference for the Romanian-led ARMLET project. Lucy Rawlings attended the event to report on the initiative itself and witness first-hand some of capabilities of the air marshals trained as part of this European Union-funded programme.

The ARMLET project first came to life in 2014 with the mission of creating an air marshal training centre and programme, and was dedicated to “increasing the operational capacity for authorities in the field of fighting against in-flight threats”. The main objectives of the project were: to establish a permanent training facility for personnel involved in in-flight security operations; to provide the necessary know-how for European Union Member States interested in implementing an in-flight security programme; and, to become a platform for sharing ‘best practices’ and ‘lessons learned’.

The project has been led by the National Intelligence Academy ‘Mihai Viteazul’ as part of a joint venture with the Gradistea Training Centre and, from the Romanian Intelligence Service, the General Directorate for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism/Antiterrorist Brigade. It has been co-funded by a 1.6 million Euro grant from the ‘Prevention Of and Fight Against Crime Programme’ of the European Union.

ARMLET was awarded the funding as the programme and training centre are seen to be vital in helping to support key aviation security goals within the EU’s security development plans and aid them in securing their nations’ borders.

Radoslaw Olszewski, the Policy Officer for the Counter Terrorism Unit at the European Commission, spoke on behalf of the EU at the ARMLET Closing Conference and stated that the EU would like to help strengthen other nations in this field and encourage them to utilise the facilities in Romania. He emphasised the importance of sharing knowledge and information and that the risk of not doing so could be much greater than simply fearing the information could fall into the wrong hands.

Dr. Niculae Iancu, rector of the National Intelligence Academy and ARMLET project manager, asserted ARMLET’s mission statement: ‘Train with the best to be ready for the worst’. This sets the true undertone for the project’s collaborative expertise and promotion of a new approach to aircraft security through intelligence led operations. The project’s name, ARMLET, stands for the values it represents: A – ambition, “We encourage you to overcome your limits”; R – resilience, “We train you to withstand adversity’”; M – motivation, “We stimulate and support your professional commitment”; L – legality, “We cultivate respect for the law”; E – excellence, “We embody the highest level of excellence”; and T – training, “We will help you become a truly skilled professional”.

The first Romanian air marshal unit was established in 1970 and operated exclusively on Tarom (Romania’s flag carrier) flights. Today, Romania is one of only eight EU member states that run such a programme, including the Czech Republic, Austria, France, Poland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK (although the UK’s in-flight officers are only deployed in a state of emergency). The ARMLET project is at the forefront in developing an even more refined and specialist air marshal training programme suited to the demands of aviation security and the threats it faces in the modern day. Air marshal programmes, in part due to the deterrent effect, can only be truly beneficial to the global industry if they are internationally widespread and, at ARMLET, they are trying to promote the spread of such programmes across Europe by developing a programme capable of being implemented across all EU member states.

Aircrew in general, and pilots in particular, have long promoted the concept of alleviated checkpoints on account of their responsibilities on board aircraft and their overall contribution to aviation security. In addition, the advancement of ETD (Explosive Trace Detection) equipment has allowed regulations to evolve, to distinguish between passengers and non-passengers, and to recognise the crucial role of airline staff in the aviation security picture. Charles de Couëssin examines the regulations and compares them with the measures currently in place.

One of the major challenges facing the air transport sector is finding a balance between its level of security and its ability to ensure the rapid processing of traffic, which is expected to double over the next 15 years. In particular, ‘non–passengers’ (e.g. airport staff, crew, pilots) constitute a specific category of people within airports that should be controlled differently. This is for two conflicting reasons:

1. They have the potential to pose a high risk due to their proximity to aircraft operations, maintenance and access to restricted zones;
2. They might contribute to the solution rather than to the problem, as reported by the European Cockpit Association, due to their close participation in the aviation business as well as their skills in detecting abnormal situations within terminals and aircraft themselves.

Since the events of 9/11, Regulation 2320/2002, ‘Establishing Common Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation Security’ constituted the basis of airport security controls. This framework was regularly amended until the recent 2015 version was published. In its early stage, the legislator did not make any difference between ‘passengers’ and the various categories of staff, be it a senior pilot of the flag carrier or a cleaning employee at the airport. The guiding principle of the regulation relied on the principle that the zones through which persons and/or baggage move before boarding should be considered as critical parts of a security-restricted area.

Based on the legislation, the notion of ‘restricted areas’ applies to zones where only screened passengers and baggage have access as well as where aircraft are parked before boarding or goods are loaded. These zones are separated from landside activities, and airside/landside boundaries need to be established between the two zones to ensure their physical separation.

The concept of ‘access control’ defines the procedure by which all persons are screened before being allowed to proceed into restricted areas. Moreover, they are required to ‘have a legitimate reason to be there’, which means carrying proof of authorisation such as a boarding card (passengers) or an identification card (staff). These must be checked before being granted access to security-restricted areas in order to reasonably ensure that the document (e.g. boarding card) is valid and corresponds to the holder (staff or crew).

In order to prevent unauthorised access to security restricted areas, access points must be controlled either by an electronic system (presenting a ‘logical obstruction’) or by authorised persons (a ‘physical obstruction’). Credentialing is the key process by which an employee is visually (or better, electronically) authenticated and granted unescorted access to secure and sterile areas. Credentialing involves several major sub-processes:

– Determining the holder’s identity through scrutiny of official identity documents;
– Ensuring a regulatory clearance process to determine if the applicant is qualified for airport activities and related access to secure areas;
– Conducting airport-specific security training of security procedures.