Category: Industry News

By Tony Tyler

Throughout its century of growth the success of the commercial aviation business has been built on cooperation. Every flight that takes off or lands is the result of working together and sharing information among many different entities such as airlines, airports, ground handlers and air navigation service providers (ANSPs).

Yet the very nature of our collaboration means that our industry is vulnerable to cyberattack. Each day seems to bring fresh news of a security breach or data theft. Damage from such attacks can run into hundreds of millions of dollars and leave a company’s reputation in tatters. A successful cyberattack on an airline could paralyse operations and result in thousands of stranded passengers

Cybersecurity is a new and dynamic threat and we will likely always be on a steep learning curve. One thing we do know is that we are only as strong as our weakest link. An airline is dependent on its ANSP and airport partners to be highly engaged in cybersecurity. Many airlines and airports have robust systems in place to address common hacking threats. The challenge is the evolution of the threat. Cyber experts have to improve their expertise constantly in order to remain vigilant and keep ahead of hackers. What we are facing is close to asymmetric warfare in which it is easier to attack than to defend. In order to assess the broader threat to the aviation system, there is a need to adopt a holistic approach which would include all our IT infrastructure as well as that of our partners.

To that end, the AVSEC World conference in October 2015 will for the first time be a joint effort between IATA and Airports Council International (ACI). Our aim is to reinforce the collaboration, cooperation and communication between the different elements of the air transport chain, to minimise cyber risks. Safety is the top priority for everyone associated with aviation. IATA’s role in this regard is to assist airlines in developing a robust cybersecurity strategy and to help drive coordination of global efforts to address cyber threats to aviation. To achieve this, we have put in place a three-pillar strategy that comprises:

– Working to understand, define and assess the threats and risk of cyberattack,
– Raising awareness of cybersecurity issues and identifying reporting and information sharing mechanisms,
– Advocating for appropriate regulation and mechanisms for increased cooperation throughout the industry and with Governments.

Given our environment of rapidly evolving applications of technology, a systemic, coordinated approach to understanding and addressing the potential risks is critical. And the challenge becomes even more complicated as airlines increase the use of outsourced systems and technology. An important part of the relationship with vendors and partners is developing a cybersecurity culture that is continuously evaluating and mitigating risks. Some of this is addressed in the Aviation Cyber Security Toolkit which we launched last year. The Toolkit proposes solutions to run internal analysis of current cyber risks to help security stakeholders identify ways to protect their vital IT infrastructure. It is intended for airlines but is also applicable to airports, ground handlers and others in the value chain.

Industry cooperation, while an absolute necessity, by itself will not get us where we need to be. Governments have resources and access to intelligence that the private sector can never achieve. They also have a responsibility to use these resources to support industry efforts.

As more people travel to more destinations than at any time in our history, passing through aviation security checkpoints and crossing international borders in the process, the challenge of verifying traveller identities has never been greater. This challenge is made more complex by rising expectations of shorter queues and reduced wait times, and the greater demands being placed upon comparatively few (and dwindling) numbers of trained staff available to perform the essential functions of verifying that travel documents are a) genuine, b) have not been reported as lost or stolen, and c) belong to the actual people presenting them. This is set within the prevailing need to ensure the person does not present a risk to aviation or, indeed, to the country they are leaving, travelling via or, ultimately, of their final destination. Matthew Finn delves into the issue of travel document integrity and breeder document fraud, both key factors in establishing a passenger’s genuine identity.

How can government and industry work effectively together to respond to the ‘identity challenge’? How can we ensure that only those passengers who pose no risk to either aviation or the countries along their route, are processed quickly and efficiently, whilst being absolutely certain that we are basing our risk assessment on people whose identity can be properly verified?
Much of the answer lies in the integrity of the travel document – our ability to determine that it is neither forged, nor counterfeit nor fraudulently obtained, and we can be absolutely sure it belongs to the person presenting it.

Raising the Bar: the Value of International Standards
The work of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has created a valuable set of standards in the development and advancement of high-tech documents for international travel. Specifically, ICAO Document 9303 provides detailed specifications for machine-readable passports, visas and ID cards (‘travel documents’) for use in crossing international borders.

Developments in traditional secure document printing have rendered the task of forging and counterfeiting travel documents considerably more difficult – but not impossible. The availability of specialist inks, laminates, paper, laser perforation, holograms, optically variable imaging devices and other ‘difficult to replicate’ features has meant that the modern day passport, as the most common example of a machine readable travel document (or MRTD), can be subjected to a range of controls to quickly determine its authenticity.

These developments have been made even more robust with the growing adoption of ‘electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (eMRTDs)’ – next generation passports that contain biometric (and other) data in a contactless integrated circuit chip, adopting the absolute latest thinking and recommendations as set out in ICAO 9303.

On the one hand, the myriad of document security features present in a modern travel document enable a rapid examination to ensure it is genuine; on the other hand, by using a one-to-one verification to confirm that the biometric data contained in the chip matches that of the person presenting it, the control process is able to establish that the genuine travel document actually belongs to the person presenting it. Job done? Well, not quite.

Moving Goalposts
Security specialists around the world routinely talk about “the need to stay one step ahead” of those posing a risk or seeking to do us harm. Every measure needs a counter-measure. The advancements in document security and our ability to verify it is genuine and belongs to the person presenting it is, of course, an important step forward. But the goalposts are moving. And we need to keep up with – and develop counter-measures for – new trends and the constantly evolving challenge of managing and verifying identities.

In 2007, ICAO reported that document fraud amounted to 54% of forgery detections at the border. Of these, 16% were counterfeit documents, 19% were attributed to substitutions of the photo and a further 19% were as a result of substitutions to the biographic data page. For the same period, ICAO reported that identity fraud amounted to 31%, with 21% attributable to imposters and lookalikes and the remaining 10% to fraudulently obtained genuine travel documents – arguably the hardest to detect.

Only two years later that picture had changed dramatically. In 2009, identity fraud amounted to a staggering 71% of forgery detections, 48% attributable to imposters and lookalikes and a worrying 23% – more than double – attributable to documents that had been fraudulently obtained. Conversely, document fraud – traditionally the more common of the two and arguably the easier to detect – had dropped to almost half at 29%.

In real terms, this means that identity fraud is on the rise – and the rise is significant. More recent figures aren’t widely available, but it is safe to assume that this upward trend has continued and that our challenge now is more about determining that the document truly belongs to its holder rather than whether the document itself is a forgery or counterfeit.

International Cooperation
In March 2014, the world woke up to what has become the airline industry’s greatest mystery – the tragic disappearance of Malaysian Airlines flight 370. While the fate of that aircraft and all of the passengers and crew on board remains a complete mystery – even though the flaperon which was recently washed ashore in Reunion turned out to be from MH370 – and one which fuels speculation by security specialists and conspiracy theorists alike, one key fact drew considerable attention: that two passports, reported to the international police organisation, INTERPOL, as ‘stolen’, were able to be used by two of the passengers on board. There followed considerable speculation that the holders of these documents were linked to the aircraft’s disappearance and had links to terror organisations.

Ultimately, INTERPOL concluded that neither Pouria Nour Mohammad, 19, nor Seyed Mohammed Rezar Delawar, 29, both Iranian nationals, had any links to terrorism and were in fact seeking to circumvent document control procedures by travelling circuitously from Thailand to Europe via China in order to claim asylum in the EU.

MH370 put document control procedures in the spotlight with difficult questions being asked about how documents already reported as stolen could still be used by imposters for international travel. Understandably, public concern focused on how easy it would be for a terrorist, rather than an asylum seeker, to obtain and use a stolen passport and not be detected either by the airline or, indeed, the government performing outbound border control in the departure country.

In the months that followed, both INTERPOL and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) spoke about the need for international cooperation and the need for more stringent document control procedures that could verify, in real-time, whether a document being used by a passenger had ever been reported as stolen or lost and recorded as such in INTERPOL’s Stolen & Lost Travel Document (SLTD) database. There is now an urgent need for this capability to be widely available across the air transport industry and for airlines and air transport operators alike, not just governments, to be able to perform checks on passengers’ travel documents.

The good news is that a number of airlines, and Qatar Airways being first among them, are now working with INTERPOL and developing an industry-wide initiative known as i-Checkit which performs precisely that function.

The Promise of Biometrics
Against this backdrop, much has been said of the promise of biometrics and the role this particular technology can play in delivering a greatly enhanced document security capability. Adoption, however, has been incredibly slow. There remains a significant gap in terms of the capabilities some governments have – and others do not.

There have been a number of recent aircraft disasters in which all souls on board have been, or appear to have been, lost: the unexplained disappearance of MH370, the shooting down of MH17 and, most recently, the probable actions of Andreas Lubitz at the controls of 4U9525. In all cases, security procedures have come under the spotlight and in the inevitable aftermath of a disaster assessing liability has become the focus for the insurers, the airlines and, above all, the relatives of those who perished. Joanna Kolatsis explores the legal minefield which has to be traversed in order to settle claims.

Aircraft safety and aircraft security have long been linked. Many of us remember the spate of airline hijackings throughout the 1960s and 70s, where cockpits were stormed and pilots forced to divert aircraft to unplanned destinations for political or terrorist reasons. Increased vigilance and security lead to a significant decrease in this type of criminal activity, such that by 2001, we had all become far more blasé about the possibility of terrorist attacks on flights. Clearly 9/11 changed everything.

As a result of 9/11, and subsequent (thankfully unsuccessful) terrorist attempts, airlines and airports have made major changes in aviation security measures. Ironically, one of the changes following 9/11 has been a significant factor in the most significant accident in Europe for many years – the loss of Germanwings flight 4U9525. The increased cockpit door security designed to keep a terrorist out of the cockpit, also apparently kept out a Captain seeking to stop a suicidal pilot from flying the aircraft into a mountain.

From a liability perspective, should one hold an airline and/or its personnel who take steps to prevent terrorism liable for not having the foresight to predict this type of incident?

Liability following air accidents is an ever-present concern for airlines, their directors and employees. Principally, this is not so much as a result of the damages due to families, which are governed by the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions1, but rather because airline personnel themselves face the threat of possible criminal proceedings.

2014 was the safest year on record for air accidents. This is good news and testament to the continued work airlines carry out every day to remain safe; their business depends on it. However, over the last 18 months we have seen two distinct types of accident which have entered rare and sometimes unchartered territory: unexplained loss of aircraft (Malaysian Airlines MH370) and possible pilot suicide (Germanwings 4U9525). These incidents present various hurdles for the airlines and their insurers to overcome, but more importantly, they bring into sharp focus the issues regarding both liability and security.

MH370: Technical or Security Issue?
The loss of MH370 remains a mystery, and one questions whether we might ever learn the true fate of the aircraft. Under ordinary circumstances, the outcome of an accident report will determine the cause of the accident, whether any safety recommendations are to be made, and if any operational/manual amendments are to follow. A discussion then ensues between insurers of the airline and manufacturer (if there is a degree of cause on both sides), in order to establish apportionment of damages payable to the passengers and their families as a result of the accident. However, in a scenario such as that in MH370, the difficulty arises where the reasons for the accident are unknown. Various theories abound regarding what brought the aircraft down; all that is certain for now is that the aircraft is lost and the families of the passengers have been informed accordingly.

In the background, the insurance market responds regardless of cause. In aviation insurance, the hull and liability policies are generally placed in the all-risks market. In terms of liability, the all-risks market responds regardless of whether the cause was accidental or intentional. The hull is, however, separately insured in the event of war – and in cases such as this, the two markets come together and pay the loss to the insured in equal parts, before arguing amongst themselves about who should ultimately be responsible for the entire amount.

To an outsider, the loss of MH370 is a mystery. It is, perhaps, a credit to the aviation insurance industry that it does not use the fact of an unknown cause to avoid paying the claim.

Germanwings: Security Flaw?
In Germanwings, the industry within Europe faced a new challenge: the concept of pilot suicide. This was not by any means the first case of alleged pilot suicide for the airline industry, but certainly the first within the EU. We have seen such allegations within the Asia Pacific and Middle East regions in the past but they are always unexpected and garner a sense of public questioning of how this could be allowed to happen.

It is still early days in relation to the Germanwings investigation, but a number of issues were raised both in respect of possible security flaws for airlines to consider and potential criminal liability.
Perhaps, the most controversial topic to emerge was that of the cockpit door and the ability of the flight crew to lock this from the inside. Based on reports following the incident, it appears that this is what the first officer, Andreas Lubitz, did and, in doing so, locked the Captain out of the flight deck while deliberately putting the aircraft into a descent.

Looking back, following 9/11, cockpit security became a major issue for the industry. Aviation regulations changed worldwide to provide for cockpit doors to be locked while in flight in order to prevent terrorists from entering the flight deck. There are now three modes of operation for the cockpit door: normal (locked but can be accessed via a keypad on the outside with a 30 second delay), unlocked (used by the flight crew if one of them leaves/returns from a bathroom break) and locked (this overrides the touchpad on the outside and permits the flight crew to keep the door locked).

When reviewing these regulations against the circumstances surrounding the Germanwings incident, it gives rise to a number of questions about the future of aviation security, liability and what this means for airline professionals going forward.

Procedurally, the action Lubitz carried out was ‘permissible’ in that the flight crew are capable of carrying out this step if required. The fact that this procedure could have been used deliberately to compromise the safety of the aircraft, when its original purpose was to protect the crew and passengers, was not an instance foreseen by aviation regulators. It is essential to point out that while 9/11 was a truly devastating example of terrorism, it remains the only one of its kind. Pilot suicides, however, are not a new phenomenon to the aviation world, although thankfully they are still a rare occurrence. Is the Germanwings incident, therefore, an example of security measures taken a step too far?

Liability for a Deliberate Abuse of Operational Procedures?
Much has been made of Lubitz’s state of mind and his medical history, leading to allegations that Germanwings (and its holding company Lufthansa) should in some way bear responsibility for the incident. More importantly, it has been suggested that if, as has been alleged, Lufthansa was aware of his medical history, it should have grounded Lubitz due to his delicate mental state.

It is somewhat telling that in the Germanwings case the initial announcements and press conferences post-accident were made by the French criminal prosecutor rather than the air accident investigator. In terms of criminal liability, it is commonly known that in most civil law jurisdictions, a criminal investigation is opened at the same time an air accident investigation is instigated. While the two are never meant to converge, it is a sad reality that the two streams of investigation regularly overlap.

Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention 1944 states that the sole purpose of an air accident investigation is to prevent future accidents and not to apportion blame or liability. Most recently, EC Regulation 996/2010 was brought into effect in order to provide a framework for air accident investigation within the EU and reiterated the statement made within Annex 13.

However, the ideals of Annex 13 and Regulation 996 are generally at odds with the society we live in today; a ‘blame culture’ where someone has to be made responsible. The criminal investigations and prosecutions following air incidents that have ensued over the last few years corroborate this school of thought. The Air France Concorde accident in 2000 is an example of this when police cordoned off the accident site as a crime scene and air accident investigators could not gain access. No one would suggest that passengers and their families should not be adequately compensated when a tragedy occurs, but the current status has led to a ‘them and us’ situation. Most airline employees and officials live with the fear that one day their operation could be affected by such a tragedy which may have further impact on their own personal lives if they are accused or found to be criminally liable for an incident.

Airlines are complex operational organisations that are heavily regulated and rightly so. They carry millions of passengers around the world, and therefore, regulation is required to ensure the safety of passengers and crew at all times. Where an airline suffers an accident following the deliberate abuse of a procedure that exists to protect the passengers and crew, such as that of Germanwings, it is important to analyse the potential impact on the airline personnel who may face subsequent criminal proceedings.

Thankfully, to date at least, cyberattacks have not been directed against the safety and security of aircraft; they are, however, being carried out against the aviation industry through attacks on airport systems and websites, as happened at the Istanbul Ataturk International Airport in 2013, where the passport control system at the departure terminal was directly targeted. Hackers of the Islamic Cyber Resistance Group claimed to have breached the computer systems of the Israel Airports Authority; Japan Airlines reported a hacker attack in September 2014 with evidence confirming unauthorised access to its Customer Information Management System; American and United Airlines also reported that hackers managed to get hold of user names and passwords of frequent flyers in December last year, and both British Airways’ and Lufthansa’s air-miles accounts were hit by cyberattacks earlier this year. On 12th April, in Tasmania, Hobart International Airport’s website was shut down for over 24 hours due to a cyberattack by a group with alleged ties to Islamic State.

Therefore, should a hacker be able to attack these websites, how long would it take for them to actually bypass the firewalls of the air control system to be able to carry out a cyberattack against an aircraft in-flight? Indeed, the threat of cyberattacks is gradually being seen as a real challenge for the aviation industry. However, what frightens me most is the lack of awareness thereof. Why do people question whether the cyber threat could be a reality? Is it because they are denying any possible threat? Or are they afraid to admit such threats exist, because doing so would then ultimately mean that it would be deemed a reality?

But what if an aircraft has already been subject to a cyberattack, and we have not even realised it? One of the theories put forward regarding the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 was based on such a possibility.  And more specifically, how could it be that in 2015, in an age where technology is being utilised to an absolute degree, we are still not able to identify the whereabouts of an aircraft? Therefore, could this have been the first cyberattack without anyone even realising or declaring it?

However, whether we are ignorant of any future threats towards the aviation industry, or whether we are afraid to acknowledge even the slightest remote possibility of such attacks against an aircraft, I beg to question: Hasn’t the aviation industry suffered enough? And through such suffering, has the lesson been learnt?

With reference to the past terrorist attacks against the aviation industry, it is of utmost importance for us not to let history repeat itself. Immediately after 9/11, security measures were heightened; but are we failing yet again to address in toto future threats? As a direct response to 9/11, there was the establishment of a 9/11 Commission which highlighted four essential failures present in the United States’ aviation security: the failure of imagination, the failure of policy, the failure of capabilities and the failure of management.

By Andy Blackwell

As Internet Messaging applications continue to proliferate and the use of social media becomes a way of life for many, it’s hardly surprising that terrorists, other criminals and hoaxers are exploiting some of these technologies as a tool to communicate threats.

Many well-known terrorist groups have an internet presence, which is usually focused on propaganda and recruitment. The Yemen-based Islamist group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), regularly produces its online ‘Inspire’ magazine, which as the name suggests, is aimed at inspiring individuals to engage in jihad. The group has been linked to a number of terrorist plots targeting civil aviation, including the underwear bomb plot, where a Nigerian man tried to bomb a US-bound flight on Christmas Day 2009 with an IED sewn into his underwear; the cargo planes bomb plot in 2010, which involved sophisticated IEDs being concealed in printer cartridges introduced into the cargo system; and a further foiled plot in 2012 to attack a US-bound plane using an updated ‘underwear bomb’ which was fortunately foiled by an insider who had infiltrated the group.

According to open sources, the online edition of Inspire released by AQAP on Christmas Eve 2014, to coincide with the anniversary of the first underpants bomb plot, was almost entirely devoted to civil aviation. Details of its so-called ‘hidden bomb’, explosive recipes and their views on how to evade security systems were all noted.

In addition to their internet presence, a number of groups make use of social networking sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, as propaganda tools. They highlight their activities and make statements about future strategies, with the spread of such information being a cause for concern. In the UK for example, the downloading and possession of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism is a criminal offence according to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and a number of individuals have been successfully prosecuted for being in possession of AQAP’s Inspire magazine.

Recently, hoaxers have been exploiting the Internet and social media as effective tools to create disruption to civil aviation. One practice, which originated in the United States, is referred to as ‘Swatting’, the act of tricking an emergency service (via such means as hoaxing a 911/999 dispatcher) into dispatching an emergency response based on the false reports of a critical incident. The term that has been used by the FBI as far back as 2008, derives from SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics), a highly specialised type of police unit.

The practice of making hoax calls is not new, but the method of delivery has certainly evolved. The term ’10p terrorism’ was widely used during the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ to describe one of the Provisional IRA’s most cost-effective forms of disruption. For the cost of a telephone call, their hoax bomb threats regularly caused widespread interference to transport networks, public places and sporting events. Assessment processes were then introduced and continue to remain highly effective in terms of safely determining the credibility of threat messages and our responses to them.

Whilst conventional hoax telephone calls are still being received by the industry, advances in messaging technology has changed the modus operandi of hoaxers. One example of this is the use of Twitter to disseminate hoax threat messages. Media reports in August 2014 highlighted what appeared to be an escalation of tactics by a gaming hacker group, believed responsible for Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks on a number of gaming servers. A bomb threat was tweeted which resulted in a commercial aircraft carrying the CEO of a major online entertainment company being diverted, to enable additional security checks to be conducted on the aircraft. The CEO is reported to have tweeted details of his flight plan earlier that day, which may have prompted the hoaxers to target the flight in question. This incident highlights a number of issues, including the personal security awareness of staff, particularly in terms of what they ‘publish’ online about their travel movements. It also underlines the need for a greater understanding that the World Wide Web is a valuable resource for those with sinister intent, who may wish to gather information to authenticate hoaxes and other malicious messages.

In January 2015, media reports suggested that in excess of fifty ‘threat’ messages had been sent to airlines globally, along with at least one airport, all falsely reporting that bombs had been placed. A number of the incidents resulted in fighter aircraft being launched to escort the commercial aircraft into diversion airports where police conducted detailed searches and interviewed passengers on board. All of the swatting threats made against aviation entities were found to be hoaxes and attracted significant publicity. There is little doubt that the level of media reporting subsequently resulted in copycat activities occurring.

Whilst it could be argued that advances in web-based messaging systems make it easier to anonymously deliver hoax messages, such systems do create electronic audit trails, therefore, can provide investigators with useful information to support law enforcement investigations.

Despite many recommendations by aviation security experts, relatively little practical attention has been given to the insider threat – that posed by any airline or airport-based employee with access to security restricted areas. From baggage handlers to aircrew, maintenance personnel to security staff and cleaners to caterers, those we trust have the opportunity to infiltrate a weapon or other prohibited item into what is supposed to be a sterile zone. The insider threat is a fundamental weakness of our aviation security regime and our failure to address it could afford certain groups the opportunity to effect the next terrorist atrocity. Steve Collins considers how concealed weapons might be infiltrated airside and what steps need to be taken to identify their carriers.

With the exception of firearms, explosives and knives, aircrew and airport employees are at liberty to carry almost anything they want on board an aircraft. The very nature of certain people’s jobs makes screening difficult if not impossible. Take, for example, the aircraft cleaners with the large array of cleaning materials and equipment which they routinely carry, or the mechanic with weapons which could easily be disguised as tools, or the baggage loader or cargo handling agent who one expects to see loading items into the hold of an aircraft.

Although in some locations such personnel are subject to the same security screening procedures as passengers, it generally tends to be less rigorous, and of course the insider is knowledgeable about their work environment, understands the system and how to compromise it. And, in places where the issuance of an airport ID card equals an exemption from screening protocols altogether, the risks are even higher.

Concealed weapons pose a colossal problem to law enforcement officers and security personnel worldwide. Volumes have been written on the techniques employed to carry guns, knives and other weapons in a concealed manner. And, it doesn’t matter whether you are a police officer, a soldier or a bank robber, if you carry a weapon as a tool of your trade there are only two very simple rules to remember: a) Take it with you when you go to work, and b) Keep it in a safe and convenient place until you need it.
The police officer and the soldier will happily and overtly display their weapons most of the time. Criminals, for obvious reasons, need to conceal their weapons at all costs…especially if they are a trusted insider.

Concealed Weapons
First and foremost, what is a concealed weapon? Concealed weapons are weapons which are kept hidden on one’s person or under one’s control. ‘To conceal’ means

‘to keep from being seen, found, observed, or discovered’;
‘to prevent disclosure or recognition of’;
‘to avoid exposure of’;
‘to refrain from revealing’;
‘to withhold knowledge of’;
‘to draw attention from’;
‘to treat so as to be unnoticed’.

A firearm or any other dangerous weapon is concealed if it is carried in such a manner so as to be undetectable by the ordinary observation of an onlooker.

Carrying a concealed weapon is illegal in most parts of the world, unless the person is a law enforcement officer, or the holder of an official licence or permit to carry a concealed weapon. For example, some states in the USA do allow citizens to carry a concealed firearm under the so-called ‘concealed carry law’. However, there is often no requirement that there be absolute invisibility of the weapon; merely that it is not on open view to a bystander.

A dangerous weapon would be considered concealed if it is not secured, and is worn under clothing; or carried in a package or bag that is held or carried by an individual; or transported in a vehicle under the individual’s control or direction and available for immediate use, e.g. kept under the seat or in a glove compartment. One must remember that at airside access control points, vehicles might be subject to inspection but the degree of inspection makes it extremely difficult to identify a weapon concealed therein.

A firearm or dangerous weapon is not considered concealed if it is:

Carried on a belt in a holster or sheath, which is visible, or carried in a case designed for carrying a firearm or weapon and which is visible;
Locked in a closed boot or luggage compartment of a vehicle;
Carried in the field while lawfully engaged in hunting, clay pigeon shooting or target shooting, even if not visible;
Carried by any person permitted by law to possess a firearm (unloaded) or weapon in a secure covering from the place of purchase to the person’s home or place of business, or to or from a place of repair.

Firearms
In the case of firearms it is possible to spend a small fortune on sophisticated concealment holsters and carry systems. You can, of course, just stuff it down the back of your pants and spend nothing, although only an exceptionally confident insider would brazenly walk through an airport checkpoint with such a simplistic concealment.

Although the ‘concealed carry law’ is in force in the USA, most places in the world do not, under any circumstances, allow you to carry anything for personal protection, especially not a firearm. That said, we all know to our cost that the law of the land does not apply to the criminal.

First let’s consider the physical act of carrying a gun. It’s probably going to be quite heavy – almost a kilo on average (about the same as a bag of sugar). It’s hard with no flexibility and it has very defined edges. It has to be instantly accessible; ideally somewhere near the waistline or upper torso, and you really don’t want anyone to see it until you want them to.

There are some law enforcement and government agents who are experts in concealed carry. Operatives will take great care to match the method of carry with their mode of dress. Some will have specially tailored suites to disguise bulges caused by holsters. Weapons accessory manufacturers produce a vast range of holsters specifically for concealed carry, i.e. shoulder holsters, inside-the-belt holsters, ankle holsters, small-of-the-back pancake holsters, handbag holsters, folio holsters, briefcase holsters. The list goes on and on.

Many firearms manufacturers have a range of ultra slim, sub-compact pistols, especially for covert operatives. And of course disguised firearms are hidden in plain sight by the mere fact that they could look like anything apart from a gun that is.

On the other hand, your average thug, fortunately, is not very sophisticated and will have little to no access to specialised equipment. Thugs, however, might be a concern at a nightclub or tourist attraction, but not at an airport where the trained terrorist is our primary challenge. Here it is more than likely that their firearm will be a full-size, full-frame model.

Given aviation industry concern about a front-of-house attack, it is now incumbent upon all security personnel operating in terminals and effecting landside/road access surveillance to be familiar with behavioural detection techniques which might pre-empt a potential assault.

Spotting the Concealed Carry
It may be considered a dirty word in our politically correct world, but the sad fact is ‘profiling’ helps keep people alive, and if the price to pay to save a life is to possibly upset or even offend someone, well then so be it!

Picking out the person with a weapon (good guys or bad guys) is no bad thing. It all revolves around how people behave when carrying a weapon.

From a security point of view the mindset has to be that, “Everyone has a weapon and intends to use it”. Our brains have the ability to identify all kinds of minute details you don’t consciously see.

The brain puts the whole picture together, and sends out warning signals that say, “something is wrong”. You may call this a gut feeling… Don’t ignore it!

The following list of visual clues is based on information from and the experience of police officers around the world:

Signs of Concealment
Wearing inappropriate attire inconsistent with the weather or season. Heavy jacket, sweater, hats or gloves in the height of summer. Or, perhaps, a coat left open in bad weather making for easy access to a concealed weapon.

Wearing an outer garment with lots of pockets, for example a photographers’ vest or safari jacket.

Wearing very loose-fitting and voluminous clothing.

A coat or jacket may hang unnaturally, or the hemline or collar may be pulled down on one side by the weight of a gun in the pocket. Also the collar may be pulled tight against the back of the suspect’s neck.

Shirts that are not tucked in are a modern fashion, but it is a common technique used to conceal a weapon. Also a shirt that is only partly tucked in can be used to create an improvised holster for carry inside the waistband.

If a handgun is in a holster, or just tucked in the pants under a shirt, the shirt will often be customised by replacing the buttons with hook-and-eye type fastenings or Velcro. The buttons are removed and restitched on the outside to give the appearance of a normal shirt. This technique gives easy access to a weapon.

Thousands of passengers go through airport security checkpoints daily. We are all very familiar with the traditional search for metallic threats and weapons through the common use of Walk-Through Metal Detectors (WTMD) or Hand-Held Metal Detectors (HHMD) combined with physical pat-down or body search. But since the 2009 ‘Underwear Bomber’ incident, and the subsequent disruption of other plots and the interruption of chatter which have indicated the potential use of non-metallic threats by terrorists, the application of Full-Body Scanners, Whole Body Imagers (WBIs) or Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) has become increasingly prevalent. Amir Neeman examines these technologies and evaluates the risks related to their usage in an airport screening environment compared to their security and operational benefits.

While some Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) systems are based on X-ray transmission, others rely on X-ray Backscatter and most of those in regular use are based on millimetre wave. The widest deployment of such AITs are by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in U.S. airports.
 
AITs allow airport security personnel to effectively detect threats and contraband (with the potential to be concealed within or beneath clothing) without the physical contact necessitated by a physical pat-down search.

While AITs are undoubtedly more effective in the detection of a broader range of threats than the more traditional screening technologies, such as magnetometers, they have also generated much more controversy. One key concern is the public safety implication of exposing passengers, aircrew and airport employees to frequent exposure to potentially harmful electromagnetic and ionising radiation. But are such concerns based on fact or are they just the result of scaremongering by the media and civil libertarians?

X-ray Backscatter AIT
OSI Systems (Rapiscan), American Science and Engineering (AS&E), and Tek84 Engineering Group are the leading manufacturers of the backscatter systems for passenger screening. This technology generates small amounts of X-rays which reflect off passengers’ skin placed in front of the scanner. The scattered ionising energy of the X-rays is then picked up by backscatter detectors and processed to produce a two-sided image. The resulting image is then converted into a cartoon-like body outline – an avatar – with potential threats highlighted on it. Traditional backscatter scanners require one operator to direct the passenger through the scanner – a process taking around 15 seconds – while another operator analyses the image.

Unlike mobile phone signals, or millimetre-wave scanners, the energy emitted by a backscatter X-ray is a type of ionising radiation that breaks chemical bonds. Ionising radiation is considered carcinogenic even in small doses, but at the doses used by backscatter scanners this effect is believed to be negligible for an individual.

While X-rays used for medical imaging penetrate through the body, X-rays used in airport full-body scanners mostly interact with or near the surface of the skin. Several key radiation safety studies were conducted between 2009 and 2011 by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), Rapiscan’s Third-Party Radiation Testing group, the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Office of Law Enforcement Standards, and Johns Hopkins University Independent Assessment group. Each assessment proved the effective dose rate to be below the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society’s standard annual dose limit of 250 μSv over a 12-month period.
 
The effective dose estimates from a single scan range from 0.015 μSv to 0.1 μSv. To put these numbers into perspective, air travel (depending on route and altitude flown) can expose a passenger to 0.04 μSv per minute from cosmic radiation. Another perspective is that a passenger would have to pass through a backscatter scanner 1000–2000 times to equal the dose from a medical chest X-ray; alternatively, consider one backscatter scan being equivalent to the dose received from three to nine minutes of normal daily living from background radiation!

The TSA operators themselves typically receive less than 100 μSv per year, which is well below the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s occupational safety health limit of 50,000 μSv per year.
In 2012 the European Commission had a similar study conducted by the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR). The Committee found that the effective dose, which takes into consideration the type of radiation and the sensitivity of the body parts exposed, is the best parameter to assess the health risk from ionising radiation.

The effective doses per scanned passenger are 0.02 to 0.1 µSv for backscatter systems and 0.1 to 5.0 µSv for transmission. The organ doses have generally the same order of magnitude. For persons scanned three times every working day, security scanning would result in an incremental effective dose of approximately 300 µSv (0.3 mSv) per year for the backscatter technique and close to 3 mSv per year for the transmission technique (assuming doses of 0.4 and 4 µSv per scan, respectively). The latter would exceed the dose limit for the general public and hence would not comply with the current radiation protection standards for the very extreme of the most frequently screened and therefore highest exposed group. The former remains within the range characterised as negligible by the US National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP). The potential magnitude of cancer risk from doses received from AITs cannot be estimated, but is likely to remain so low that it cannot be distinguished from the effects of other exposures including both ionising radiation from other sources (including natural) and background risk due to other factors.

Another reason why scepticism still surrounds backscatter units is because of studies which, by their very nature, make the general public question their safety. Some of the studies have been less than rigorous to put it mildly and should not be regarded as providing definitive proof of the conclusions reached; Marquette University’s College of Engineering (Milwaukee, Wisconsin) conducted a study concluding that ionising radiation emitted from backscatter scanning devices extends to organs deeper than the skin, but even that study found that the dose of ionising radiation was still lower than the established health standards.

By Andy Blackwell

As Internet Messaging applications continue to proliferate and the use of social media becomes a way of life for many, it’s hardly surprising that terrorists, other criminals and hoaxers are exploiting some of these technologies as a tool to communicate threats.

Many well-known terrorist groups have an internet presence, which is usually focused on propaganda and recruitment. The Yemen-based Islamist group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), regularly produces its online ‘Inspire’ magazine, which as the name suggests, is aimed at inspiring individuals to engage in jihad. The group has been linked to a number of terrorist plots targeting civil aviation, including the underwear bomb plot, where a Nigerian man tried to bomb a US-bound flight on Christmas Day 2009 with an IED sewn into his underwear; the cargo planes bomb plot in 2010, which involved sophisticated IEDs being concealed in printer cartridges introduced into the cargo system; and a further foiled plot in 2012 to attack a US-bound plane using an updated ‘underwear bomb’ which was fortunately foiled by an insider who had infiltrated the group.

According to open sources, the online edition of Inspire released by AQAP on Christmas Eve 2014, to coincide with the anniversary of the first underpants bomb plot, was almost entirely devoted to civil aviation. Details of its so-called ‘hidden bomb’, explosive recipes and their views on how to evade security systems were all noted.

In addition to their internet presence, a number of groups make use of social networking sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, as propaganda tools. They highlight their activities and make statements about future strategies, with the spread of such information being a cause for concern. In the UK for example, the downloading and possession of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism is a criminal offence according to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and a number of individuals have been successfully prosecuted for being in possession of AQAP’s Inspire magazine.

Recently, hoaxers have been exploiting the Internet and social media as effective tools to create disruption to civil aviation. One practice, which originated in the United States, is referred to as ‘Swatting’, the act of tricking an emergency service (via such means as hoaxing a 911/999 dispatcher) into dispatching an emergency response based on the false reports of a critical incident. The term that has been used by the FBI as far back as 2008, derives from SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics), a highly specialised type of police unit.

The practice of making hoax calls is not new, but the method of delivery has certainly evolved. The term ’10p terrorism’ was widely used during the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ to describe one of the Provisional IRA’s most cost-effective forms of disruption. For the cost of a telephone call, their hoax bomb threats regularly caused widespread interference to transport networks, public places and sporting events. Assessment processes were then introduced and continue to remain highly effective in terms of safely determining the credibility of threat messages and our responses to them.

Whilst conventional hoax telephone calls are still being received by the industry, advances in messaging technology has changed the modus operandi of hoaxers. One example of this is the use of Twitter to disseminate hoax threat messages. Media reports in August 2014 highlighted what appeared to be an escalation of tactics by a gaming hacker group, believed responsible for Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks on a number of gaming servers. A bomb threat was tweeted which resulted in a commercial aircraft carrying the CEO of a major online entertainment company being diverted, to enable additional security checks to be conducted on the aircraft. The CEO is reported to have tweeted details of his flight plan earlier that day, which may have prompted the hoaxers to target the flight in question. This incident highlights a number of issues, including the personal security awareness of staff, particularly in terms of what they ‘publish’ online about their travel movements. It also underlines the need for a greater understanding that the World Wide Web is a valuable resource for those with sinister intent, who may wish to gather information to authenticate hoaxes and other malicious messages.

by Charles De Couessin

Over the last decade we have witnessed an optimisation of airport control procedures, including online check-in, eGates, and automated boarding. Despite these innovations, airport security screening itself remains a tedious process, with all passengers undergoing similar controls, whatever their category of risk or whichever travel scheme they are part of. Aviation stakeholders have deplored the fact that travellers’ experiences are negatively impacted during the airport controls, that they have less time to spend in retail areas and that throughput rates can, at times, result in flight delays.

Conferences and working groups have highlighted the shortcomings of a procedure which is unsuited to the anticipated growth in air traffic and does not exploit the data which passengers provide to reservation systems when booking their flights and to operators during the check-in process, whether it be in person, at the airport or via internet.

The 37th ICAO General Assembly (October 2010) recommended that industry and government representatives work on the concept of a new checkpoint based on the exploitation of passengers data to assess their potential risk, with the view to updating Annex 172. IATA and the Airport Council International have formed expert groups to assess how various technologies and procedures could be combined for the provision of a less invasive security check for ‘bona fide’ travellers.

The aviation industry anticipates a need to implement new tools upstream to the airport terminal which is still considered as the ‘the last line of defence’. But, what would be the role of API and PNR programmes in the view of a ‘risk based’ approach which aims to simplify procedures for ‘bona fide’ passengers, while tightening the screening of travellers who have a higher attributed risk?
Does such data represent an isolated piece of a more complex puzzle? And if this is the case, what will be the final outcomes of data processing: alleviating the burden of airport checkpoints or facilitating border crossing procedures? Is it possible to transpose the procedures currently implemented for automating border management processes?

Under the banner of ‘SmartS’, IATA and ACI are now involved in a new approach which aims to take into account the notion of passengers’ risk. The concept is simple: the majority of passengers are ‘bona fide’ who desire an efficient and comfortable travel experience. Data processing should be carried out upstream to attribute a certain risk level; however, all travellers will undergo a security check which varies depending on a risk indicator.

One of the most fundamental elements of a screening checkpoint is the ability to determine whether or not an individual is carrying a prohibited or restricted item. The range of items we are now searching for at airports has grown over the years and many argue that the days of magnetometer inspection are now passé.

Granted that the current terrorist threats involve explosive devices – in a multitude of formats – chemical, biological and radiological weapons, as well as materials which, inflight, can be converted into improvised incendiary devices, should we really be restricting our efforts to detecting metallic items?

Then again, there appears to be no single technology which can address all threats. We have rolled out millimetre wave systems with much fanfare, yet they have elongated the time it takes to screen a passenger – if one include the time it takes to divest pocket contents prior to screening – and are unlikely to identify an explosive device concealed in a body cavity or surgically implanted. Furthermore, even CB-weaponry is likely to pass through millimetre wave portals undetected.

Objections to the deployment of advanced imaging technology (AIT), or body scanners to use common parlance, appear in abundance in social media and civil liberties groups have fuelled the flames by intimating both that their usage is unnecessary and that such examination is an invasion of privacy. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) points out, “Passengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and should not be required to display highly personal details of their bodies such as evidence of mastectomies, colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes and the size of their breasts or genitals as a pre-requisite to boarding a plane.” They don’t!

The industry appears to have caved in to the scaremongering and governments have resisted attempts to deploy the most effective screening technologies. As a result, we continue to utilise the least effective systems and pin our future aspirations on bureaucratic, data-driven processes which imply that they “know” people. Most disturbing of all, data profiling cannot be applied worldwide and will, in the near future, only serve, albeit with questionable effectiveness, the needs of the wealthy states in the developed world.