Category: Industry News

A discussion of profiling in airport passenger screening must begin by defining the term. Profiling in general refers to the law enforcement practice of viewing particular characteristics as indicators of criminal behaviour. Profiling can be carried out singularly or in conjunction with other law enforcement practices. Racial profiling is a practice where a law enforcement official relies on a passenger’s actual or perceived race or ethnicity, either alone or together with other factors, in determining whether to stop, search, question or detain him/her. In the same vein, religious profiling occurs when a law enforcement official relies on a passenger’s actual or perceived religion as the only factor, or one of several factors, in determining whether to stop, search, question and/or detain. Similarly, national origin profiling occurs when a law enforcement official relies on a passenger’s actual or perceived nationality, including where their passport was issued, as the only, or one of several factors, to determine whether to stop, search, question or detain him/her. In a post-9/11 world, the limitations on racial, religious and national origin have become slightly murkier, as not all types of profiling appear to be similarly treated under the law and relevant agency guidelines.

In the US, post-9/11 courts have generally discouraged the use of racial and religious profiling by airport officials. For example, American courts have often frowned on the use of race or religion as a factor to form sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop a passenger1 or in forming probable cause to remove a passenger from a plane and make an arrest.2 The prohibition of national origin profiling at US airports, however, is less clear-cut. In fact, while documents from the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) appear to prohibit racial and religious profiling, profiling based on nationality or country of origin appears readily permitted. Specifically, TSA documents reveal that passengers from at least 14 countries, nearly all in the Middle East or Africa, are routinely required to undergo enhanced security screening at US airports.

The parameters of profiling at US airports were further clarified when the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) updated its profiling guidelines for federal law enforcement agencies in December 2014. The new federal rules prohibit federal officials from profiling based on race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, and general identity. However, the profiling guidelines provide exemptions for certain activities by the TSA at airports, as well as Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, Border Patrol agents, and protective activities of the US Secret Service.

While legal cases and the TSA and DOJ’s guidelines offer some guidance to federal law enforcement officials at airports about the parameters of passenger profiling, a key question for airport officials is not only whether it is legally permissible to profile airline passengers based on race, religion or national origin, but also whether profiling is an effective mechanism in identifying risks to aviation security, particularly terrorism risks. When considered from that angle, the profiling of passengers at airports seems much less sensible. In fact, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, many security experts have adopted the position that passenger profiling based on race, religion or national origin is oversimplified and lazy law enforcement practice. Experts point out that focusing on profiling based on perceived external characteristics associated with race, religion or national origin distracts law enforcement officials from doing the harder work of gathering good intelligence and looking for suspicious passenger behaviour.

Moreover, there are several practical problems with relying on profiling passengers at airports. First, profiling based on race, religion or national origin is much too broad a characteristic to use to identify passengers posing potential security risks, as there are simply too many people whose perceived race, religion or national origin might make them a target for further security screening. This makes passenger profiling extremely imprecise and largely ineffective. Any actual security risks identified using such overbroad profiles based on race, religion or national origin would be more likely to result from chance than any actual really good security work.

Second, profiling airline passengers based on race, religion or national origin is ineffective because would-be terrorists and other security threats will simply alter their appearance, travel routes or cities of departure to avoid detection. Sadly we know this to be true based on significant evidence that terror groups are deliberately recruiting individuals whose appearance and passports can avoid standard profiling-based detection, and in particular are increasingly relying on Muslim coverts to carry out attacks. Such measures offer caution against relying on passenger screening profiling based on appearance, and important warnings about the adaptability of would-be terrorists and other security threats.

By Geoffrey D. Askew AM

Each year the aviation industry experiences events that make seasoned security professionals just shake their heads.

At airports around the world there are dedicated and committed people working tirelessly at checkpoints and other security facilities providing protection for the industry and the travelling public as well as for the millions of people who work at and or visit those airports. In the USA, thanks to the transparency of the operations of the Transportation Security Authority (TSA), we know that somewhere between 30 and 40 loaded firearms are still being detected every week at U.S. checkpoints.

The industry and regulators have, understandably, demonstrated very little tolerance for lapses in concentration or effort by aviation security officers. If they are lucky they may be sent for retraining, otherwise they are looking for a new job.

What is of concern is that there continue to be reports of senior industry and high-profile individuals who should be setting an example when it comes to safety and security. Alas they are not.
Take for example the occasional pilot who doesn’t believe that they should have to be screened because as they say, “I could drive the plane into the mountain if I wanted to.” Their demeanour and body language is appalling and is on open display at the checkpoint for everyone to see. Thankfully they are few and far between. But, let’s be honest, one is one too many.

What about New Zealand’s Transport Minister last July? Mr Gerry Brownlee entered a gate lounge at Christchurch International Airport through an ‘exit only’ door bypassing the screening process with his two aides. Mr Brownlee publicly apologised and said that he acted “without thought” because he was running late for a flight. He was subsequently fined NZD $2000 (US$1,587).
‘Rebellion in the air – Passengers confront top MP over phone use’ was a headline in a recent Australian newspaper revealing that, in 2013, passengers had rounded on the then nation’s top law official, Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus, when he refused to stop using his mobile phone during the take-off of his flight in Sydney. The Australian Federal Police met the aircraft when it arrived in Brisbane. After discussions it is reported that the airline withdrew its complaint and Mr Dreyfus apologised for his behaviour.

Former Chelyabinsk Deputy Governor Andrei Tretyakov hit the headlines in December 2013 after being arrested for assaulting a flight attendant who refused to let him use a Business Class toilet. Mr Tretyakov was traveling Economy on a Krasnoyarsk-Moscow flight, which was forced to land midway in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk as a result of the incident. Charges against him were dropped last year after he paid compensation to the offended parties. Flight attendant Anton Chernyshov, who police said was hospitalised with bruising and a head injury after the sustained attack, says the former Deputy Governor paid him 1.25 million rubles in damages. Chernyshov said he asked a court in the Siberian city of Ob to drop the case after receiving compensation. Tretyakov told the court that he had also paid the airline, Globus, “about 300,000 rubles” for the aborted flight.

And then there is the case last December of Cho Hyun-ah, the former Korean Air Vice President in charge of inflight service and the daughter of the chairman of Korean Air, whose dismay over the way she was served macadamia nuts led to a plane returning to its gate at New York’s John F. Kennedy airport to remove the cabin crew chief.

“…when we asked what the background levels of potassium chlorate would be in an airport we were told that they don’t know…”

Recently in my travels through an airport I overheard some other passengers engaged in a discussion around airport security. I won’t repeat the whole tale, but let’s just say it was branded ‘security theatre’. A quick ‘google’ of the phrase brings up the Wikipedia page where it is described as “the practice of investing in countermeasures intended to provide the feeling of improved security while doing little or nothing to actually achieve it”. I had not heard this description before and was disturbed to hear that there were people who held this view.

As someone who is, as an academic researching explosive detection solutions, casually acquainted with security screening industry – although I still view myself as outsider – reflecting on my own experiences travelling around the world, and through various transportation hubs, is insightful. Inconsistency is, I believe, the main reason for the perception of ‘security theatre’. In some jurisdictions there is a requirement to take off my shoes, whilst in others there isn’t. Sometimes I need to start up my computer/iPad/phone, whilst in others I don’t. Some do not detect the forgotten keys in my pocket, while at others I am sent back through the archway and rescreened having divested them. In some I receive a random ETD test, while in others I don’t. If the purpose is to identify and detect security threats, how can these all be doing it to the same extent if they are doing it all differently and to different levels?

In my academic research we conduct experiments and make observations, compile these into a data set and then construct arguments to explain them. This develops into a hypothesis which is then interrogated through more experiments to ensure it is robust and that we are correct. This is then published and available to other academics or provided in reports to industry and government where it may be used to make decisions and justify policy. Is it a lack of evidence or a different interpretation of that evidence that results in a difference in practice between Sydney and Los Angeles?

by Philip Baum

On 27th January, the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau – the largest of the Nazi death camps, I attended a service which was one of many events taking place as part of Holocaust Memorial Day. This date was selected to commemorate that history on 27th January 2000, when representatives from 46 governments met in Stockholm to discuss Holocaust education, remembrance and research. All the attendees signed a declaration, now known by many as the Stockholm Declaration, committing to preserving the memory of those who had been murdered in the Holocaust.

Television programmes aired during the same week as Holocaust Memorial Day reminded viewers of the horrors of Nazi Germany and how an advanced, supposedly civilised state, could transform itself into a barbaric regime capable of murder on an industrial scale. Much of the footage I had seen before yet, as with the attacks in the United States in 2001, no matter how many times one views the evidence, it remains incomprehensible that human beings can foster such hatred and loathing of those who do not share their own beliefs, that they can commit acts of such depravity.

Whilst much of the focus of Holocaust Memorial Day is on the attempted annihilation of Europe’s Jewish population, a speaker at the service I attended gave an interesting alternative perspective. Prof. Philip Spencer, Emeritus Professor in Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Kingston University, reminded the audience that we tend to view the Holocaust in terms of ‘perpetrators’, being the Nazis, and ‘victims’, being the Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, physically or mentally challenged individuals and brave members of the various resistance movements. Spencer reminded us, however, of a third group: those who knew what was happening but did nothing to prevent it – the ‘bystanders’. If Holocaust Memorial Day was going to have any real significance, then it was to teach us the lesson that we cannot allow industrialised murder to happen again and that we all have a duty to challenge our governments to intervene when members of the human race are being slaughtered for no other reason than that of belonging to a different faith or ethnicity.

Around a decade ago, I visited Rwanda in order to deliver a training course. Whilst there I took the opportunity to visit the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre. It had a profound impact on me as I realised that the 1994 act of genocide, in which approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been massacred, had taken place in my lifetime and I, a young adult at the time, had been aware of the atrocities taking place but had never even thought to take any action. It was an African problem; what could I possibly do? I had been a bystander to an act which the United Nations Security Council, in 2000, accepted responsibility for failing to prevent. As Canada’s Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, pointed out at the time, “The unchecked brutality of the genocidaires made a mockery, once again, of the [post-Holocaust] pledge ‘never again’”.

Since we introduced X-ray as a screening tool, the ways in which we use it have evolved. Some changes have been subtle, some less so. Training has to keep pace with the changes in the equipment and its use. Paul Quellin discusses approaches to X-ray training and highlights some considerations which need to be taken into account if one is to create an effective, knowledgeable and motivated team of operators.

From early fluoroscopes, flat array, monochrome conveyorised X-rays to multi-view, high-resolution X-rays, Computed Tomography and beyond. Pausing for a moment, it does seem we have made progress and whilst, perhaps, the pace isn’t always as quick as we might like, X-ray screening continues to evolve.
Changes in the X-ray equipment we use has to be reflected in the training we provide. Whilst that seems straightforward, we always need to be mindful of how changes to the X-ray equipment might affect the behaviour of the operators. Back in the mists of time, the industry changed from monochrome-only X-ray equipment to multi-energy colour systems. Colour had to be better, didn’t it? It seemed obvious to me as a trainer and X-ray enthusiast, but convincing some existing screeners wasn’t actually so easy. Whether they be cars, motorcycles or X-ray systems, people develop a familiarity with machines. Indeed, that familiarity may also become a sort of fondness…even for a baggage screening system.
With the roll out of ECAC Standard 2 compatible hold baggage screening X-ray equipment in Europe, many operators found themselves sat at new workstations with improved images. A number of experienced staff stated that the image quality on the new equipment wasn’t as good as their old machines. At one site, where we were providing training, we resorted to including an image from their previous system, alongside one from the Standard 2 equipment, for comparison. It seemed a stark contrast, and improvement, to me, but acceptance from the trainees was afforded somewhat begrudgingly. Perhaps the lesson was: Don’t expect screeners to immediately share your enthusiasm for new equipment… even if it is obviously better. It is worth remembering that when that same equipment becomes due for replacement some years hence, screeners may well respond in a similar way to its replacement. This may well be the case if your staff turnover rates are at low levels.

Aptitude for X-ray
Recruitment isn’t really the subject we are addressing here, but there is no denying it has to mesh well with training programmes. There is a choice for the employer here; either try to find those with ‘aptitude’ for X-ray and perhaps limit your choice, or assume that everyone has that ‘aptitude’ in there somewhere. I try to believe in the latter approach and accept it will just take longer to surface in some students. The aptitude we talk about relates to a number of factors, but spatial visualisation skills are key amongst them (mentally translating 2D shapes into actual objects). Some operations may require screeners who will only operate X-ray, but in most cases X-ray screening will be only one aspect of the work, so I would sound a note of caution about letting X-ray aptitude testing become a dominant factor in recruitment. Employment markets can fluctuate quite dramatically and perhaps you are finding that people aren’t queuing up for airport security jobs right now. One thing I am confident about is that all people can learn X-ray image interpretation skills and can reach a competent level eventually, but they just do so at markedly different rates. Of course trainers will happily spend as long as it takes, one to one tuition or whatever is needed, but the employer may have to be wary of the cost implications. You can’t always choose perfect students and if they come to you with very well developed spatial skills, frankly they are less likely to stay in aviation security. A lot has to be said for good all-rounders.

X-ray can be Fun
Though it is not something you are going to see stated in any regulator’s mandatory syllabus, getting students to become enthusiastic about X-ray image interpretation has to be a worthwhile objective in any training programme.

The cyber threat has been deemed as a new and emerging threat against the aviation industry, being referred to as the second major risk to airlines, following natural disasters. Moreover, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has identified cyberterrorism as a distinct threat to the aviation industry, being described as ‘the newest and, arguably, the most elusive threat to civil aviation in the 21st century’. Dr Rebekah Tanti-Dougall delves into the legal aspects of the cyber threat and whether there exists a legal framework to combat such threat.

In today’s digitalised world, there is an increase of dependency upon information technology by the aviation industry for critical parts of its operations, and as a result, cyber security is becoming more necessary than before. Consequently, vulnerabilities present in computer systems may be exploited by cyberterrorists resulting in serious interruption of services within the aviation industry. This is due to the fact that cyberterrorism is an attractive alternative for contemporary terrorists; it is cheaper than traditional terrorist methods since no great expenses are involved, and all that is practically needed is a computer and an internet connection. Moreover, cyberterrorism has the advantage of anonymity, enabling the hacker to avoid any physical evidence being traceable to him. It also enables the hacker to obviate physical airport checkpoints through the medium of cyberspace, allowing the terrorist to perform the act in the comfort of his own home.

The Use of the Internet as a Direct Weapon
Cyberterrorists may carry out an attack against the aviation industry by having access to the computer systems of control towers and aircraft. As a result, cyberterrorists may affect the scheduled timetables of aircraft; shut down airport administrative systems; suspend security measures; disengage communication lines between the control tower and the aircraft; tamper and manipulate information between the control tower and the aircraft; ‘spoof’ the Global Positioning System (GPS); as well as inject data into an aircraft’s Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) display, creating a ‘ghost plane’ or negating the existence of an aircraft.
In fact, cyberattacks that have already been carried out within the aviation industry include cyberattacks targeting airports such as the Istanbul Ataturk International Airport and Sabiha Gökçen Airport in 2013, where the passport control system at the departure terminal was hit causing many problems at the airport. Technical problems resulting in the failure of the passenger processing system at Indira Gandhi International (IGI) Airport in Delhi in 2011 was also believed to be a cyberattack by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Moreover, hackers of the Islamic Cyber Resistance Group have claimed to have breached the computer systems of the Israel Airports Authority. Likewise, one of the theories put forward regarding the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 has been, in fact, a cyberattack.

Current International Conventions
The Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919 (the Paris Convention) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (the Chicago Convention) attempted to develop rules for international civil aviation. However, they were drafted too early in the history of aviation security to contemplate the extensive threat of cyberterrorism against the aviation industry.

In an article published in Aviation Security International last June, I wrote that the security checkpoint is where commercial and security interests can merge to benefit operators, passengers and screeners. I suggested as well that planning and investing in the design of checkpoints, applying innovative queuing techniques, valuing the time passengers spend waiting and offering security services with aptly recruited and trained personnel, is a source of value creation that has not yet been fully exploited.

Rest assured, I have not changed my mind and, if anything, I am more convinced than ever! Moreover I am encouraged by the innovative designs and security solutions that have since been tested and deployed in some of our larger airports, including technologies that improve the detection capacities of the screening equipment.

At trade shows and conferences, our industry continues promoting innovation as a means to improving the passenger experience and, indeed, we should be as concerned with the passenger experience as we are with the reliability of the screening process.

As we transform security checkpoints with those innovations, we may want to pause and reflect, to ensure that we are not deviating from the screening mission and to validate that our services effectively deliver the level of reliability we expect from this security layer.

Innovation can extend beyond technology; it can apply to people and procedures, especially when it comes to detection reliability. In fact, security screening is a process that requires an effective and efficient alignment of people, procedures and equipment, where technology provides the tools that assist screeners in detecting threat items. However, improvements in technology won’t necessarily increase detection if we are plagued by errors and incidents.

Researchers in the United States who investigated the causes of errors have discovered, “that about 80 percent of all events are attributed to human error. In some industries, this number is closer to 90 percent. Roughly 20 percent of events involve equipment failures. When the 80 percent human error is broken down further, it reveals that the majority of errors associated with events stem from latent organisational weaknesses, whereas about 30 percent are caused by the individual worker touching the equipment and systems in the facility.”

Screening authorities and providers can improve the detection reliability of screening services, by promoting the reporting and analysis of incidents and errors, to identify the systemic causes behind most screening errors.

Organisations can use the findings of such analysis to share performance feedback with its workers, increasing their awareness and explaining as well the occurrence of error precursors: “Error precursors are unfavourable prior conditions at the job site that increase the probability for error during a specific action; that is, error-likely situations. An error-likely situation, an error about to happen, typically exists when the demands of the task exceed the capabilities of the individual or when work conditions aggravate the limitations of human nature. Error-likely situations are also known as error traps.” Sharing information about failures and learning from errors are some of the best practices found in High Reliability Organisations (HROs).

Examples of error precursors:
HROs pay a lot of attention to errors: why they are taking place and how they can be avoided. “Perhaps the most important distinguishing feature of high reliability organisations is their collective preoccupation with the possibility of failure.

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Victor Anderes is Executive Vice President of Global Elite Group.

Above my desk hangs a picture bearing the words “Never Forget 09.11.2001.” It is a fairly common picture which one often sees in the offices of security professionals, at law enforcement facilities and military barracks, on car bumper stickers and even in some civilian homes. “Never Forget” was the sentiment expressed by many after the horrific terror attacks on the US on 11th September 2001.

Ten years ago, in July 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report was published and served as the official account of the events leading up to the attacks. The report cited system weaknesses in intelligence, but also failings across the aviation security system.

A great deal of criticism was directed at the security screening standards at airports in the US, with particular regard to the fact that security screeners were underpaid and unmotivated. Turnover was extremely high as better paying jobs with less responsibility in closer proximity to screeners’ homes were available. There was also the view that security was an expense to be minimised wherever possible. The lowest bids won the screening contracts.

Recommended changes were implemented vis-à-vis the passenger screening regime in the US and the standards are now much better. Minimum standards relative to pay, benefits, training and other elements are stipulated regardless of whether the screening is performed by the Transportation Security Administration itself or by private companies (under the Screening Partnership Program). In short, ‘lowest bid’ is no longer the criteria used to award screening contracts. And, of course structurally, screening is now accomplished under the direct oversight of the Transportation Security Administration.

Problem solved? Not so fast…and this is where we indeed have FORGOTTEN!

Passenger screeners are only a small facet of the security force engaged in protecting the entire aviation system. Think cargo screeners, cargo warehouse guards, catering searchers, aircraft guards, aircraft searchers, baggage guards, passenger profilers, airport perimeter guards, terminal access door guards, etc. No minimum standards have been established for this significant element of the aviation security system, and the management of these security professionals is done through private security companies typically through a tender process.

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by Philip Baum, Editor, Aviation Security International

Ask most Airport Security Managers what keeps them awake at night and they are prone to respond “the insider threat”. There is a well-founded concern that those we employ to clean our aircraft, cater our flights, handle our baggage, secure our perimeters or fly our airlines may well turn out to be the very people who target our industry. So, despite all the expenditure on creating the illusion of security with sophisticated technologies deployed to detect picograms of explosives in passengers’ bags, we remain vulnerable to an attack perpetrated by those who know how to bypass the checkpoint.

Addressing the insider threat is no easy task. Identifying ‘cleanskins’, devoid of any criminal record, in an environment where there is a high staff turnover rate, a higher than average number of overseas workers with limited background checks and where speed is the nature of the game, is almost entirely dependent upon other employees reporting concerns about their colleagues. Indeed, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that, once they have an airport pass or ID in hand, an airport employee is deemed to be ‘trusted’. The degree of that ‘trust’ varies globally, with most developed nations, with the notable exception of the United States, recognising that even staff require screening (body and belongings) prior to accessing security restricted areas.

For all persons cleared to work airside, we have performed an abundance of checks…or should have! Not only the security checks in order to be cleared to be issued with a pass, but also pre-employment reference checks. In other words, we have a significant amount of data and, in all cases, there will have been at least one, and probably more, face-to-face interview. And yet, despite this, we fear the insider threat.

There would be nothing new about an insider targeting an airline. It was on 11th April 1955 when an Air India flight was destroyed en route from Hong Kong to Jakarta after an aircraft cleaner, by the name of Chow-Tse Ming, infiltrated a device on board in an attempt to assassinate the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. All souls on board were lost, yet Zhou Enlai had never boarded the flight.

More recently, there have been a number of plots involving insiders, including one by a former cargo handler against fuel farms and pipelines at New York’s JFK in 2007 and another by a call centre technician, Rajib Karim, against British Airways a year later. Last year, an avionics technician by the name of Terry Lee Loewen demonstrated a willingness to drive a vehicle which he believed to be laden with explosives into Mid Continent’s Airport in Wichita.

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It is reasonable to believe that terrorist groups will continue to become more resourceful. It is highly likely that they have tested bomb variations against the presently deployed security systems and have identified weaknesses worth exploiting. Thus, the industry must be proactive and ask itself what it would do differently the day after an aircraft bombing incident. Being more diligent would be one response, but, in doing so, consideration for better passenger convenience can and should be incorporated as part of any improved security solution. Joseph S. Paresi discusses the history of security screening and explains how we can improve both security and the passenger experience.

Philip Baum, the Editor-in Chief of Aviation Security International, recently wrote an article about today’s aviation security industry being measured more by facilitation than by actual improvement to security screening. Bravo! That message seemed to be the focus of three separate aviation security conferences in the last month – not better security, but rather more bags scanned per hour through a relaxation of security.

As an industry, we certainly must recognise that security affects the convenience of free flowing travel, but we also have to recognise that security weaknesses will have catastrophic consequences if real threats are not effectively countered. We must constantly re-evaluate threats against aviation and implement solutions before our weaknesses are exploited.

A Short History of Aviation Screening
In the United States, before 9/11, security regulation was the role of a small group within the FAA. This group was established with the initial mandate of preventing hijackings. Over time, this role expanded in response to incidents. The first major incident was the downing of Pan Am 103 in 1988. At the time, there was no system that automatically detected explosive threats in hold baggage. A committee of explosive experts was established under the coordination of the National Science Foundation. This group defined the requirements of automated explosive detection which became the Certification criteria for Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) for Hold Baggage Screening, still in use today with certain appropriate modifications.

After trying various alternatives, a compliant solution was finally obtained in 1994 thanks to a clever professor from San Francisco University named Dr. Douglas Boyd. Dr. Boyd applied his knowledge of medical X-ray and Computer Tomography technology to develop the first Certified EDS, the InVision CTX 5000. While this system took over the laborious and manual effort of screeners looking at images for items that might be explosive devices in checked bags, the system did not become widely deployed until after 9/11.

In 1995, the FAA established a programme to obtain a second supplier. Traditional industry suppliers lined up. But the award was given to a little known division of Lockheed Martin led by a Chemical Engineer, Patricia Krall, who teamed with a medical supplier, Analogic.  Analogic’s founder and CEO, Bernard Gordon, embraced the challenge and within two weeks designed the first multi-slice CT security system, the L-3 eXaminer 3DX™ 6000, which was certified in 1998.

By the late-1990s, the urgency to extensively deploy certified EDS had lessened. There had not been any new incidents (involving U.S. carriers) since the downing of Pan Am 103 and the TWA 800 event was deemed to not be a terrorist attack. So by the year 2000, only about 20 EDS systems had been deployed at U.S. CAT X airports; a few had been deployed overseas.

In response to 9/11, the U.S. Congress, searching for a way to reassure the American public that security was being strengthened, passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001. This Act authorised the establishment of the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) and, with it, the widespread deployment of Certified Explosive Detection Systems by 31st December 2002. There were practical challenges associated with delivering the estimated 4,000 certified EDS systems required to outfit all existing 425 airports. TSA accepted a compromise and authorised manually operated Electronic Trace Detectors (ETDs) as an acceptable alternative, though acknowledging that they were not as effective.

The aviation industry benefitted from government-funded and government-manned systems that were deployed by the TSA. However, the 9/11 tragedy was due to a screening policy which allowed knives and box cutters to be carried onto the aircraft. Therefore, in response to this concern, an updated restricted items list was established. Further imposed limitations on liquids, as well as the removal and scanning of shoes, followed by the deployment of full body scanners occurred in response to subsequent terrorist attempts.
In concert with these policy changes, TSA faced the need to deploy new carry-on baggage checkpoint screening equipment. As only X-ray based scanning equipment were qualified and available for use, the TSA developed a solution that combined screening with an operator image analysis and mandated the divestiture of personal items into plastic bins – not ideal, but still effective.

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