Category: Industry News

With Flight 402 seemingly safely on the ground in Halifax, the local authorities take control of the situation. With hijackers, human traffickers, injured crewmembers, unruly passengers and worried passengers on board, the nightmare…and our serialisation…may be over but challenges remain.

t was one hell of a welcoming committee, thought Captain Davidson, watching the four ambulances, six police vehicles, an armoured truck and three airport vehicles surround the aircraft. “Please remain seated until you are told to stand. We will be holding here on the runway for some minutes.”

The first to arrive at the aircraft door were paramedics, closely followed by two armed police officers. As soon as they were on board, Claire directed them where Tom was holding Charlotte at the basin. The two men helped Tom lift her onto the stretcher. He gently stroked her red hair.

“You’ll be fine,” he whispered to her. “You’re a hero. Remember that. Without you, this plane could’ve been crashing into the ocean or on its way to New York now under the control of some maniac. You’ll be fine,” he repeated. Charlotte opened her eyes and winced again with pain.

“There was a chemical,” Tom explained to the paramedic. “He said it was deadly.”  He was babbling on, his words just spilling out, unable to keep the emotion from his voice. He indicated to the bottle in the basin. One of the police officers donned thick gloves and carefully lifted the bottle into a glass container with a pair of tongs.

“How long ago did she come into contact with it?”

Tom estimated that it had been twenty minutes.

“I doubt it’s going to kill her,” said the paramedic. “She would’ve been dead by now if it contained what it says on the bottle.”

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Nobody seems to be able to explain what happened to Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in the first few hours after it disappeared off the radar screens. The varying answers to this simple question are confused at best. Or, are they known but simply not in the public domain? And, if not, why not? Desmond Ross argues that if proper protocols had been followed we would not still be looking for MH370 today, almost nine months after it vanished. 

I am watching, with some amazement, the amount of money being expended in the search of the southern Indian Ocean for MH370. Like Sir Tim Clark, the CEO of Emirates Airlines, (Sydney Morning Herald 22 November 2014), I am not convinced by the official version of the final hours of MH370.  Nor am I convinced that it is anywhere near the southern Indian Ocean; and, I am quite familiar with Doppler effect, satellite handshakes and much of  the other high tech stuff that is being promulgated!

There is an excellent BBC Horizon documentary programme, on the disappearance of MH370, aired in June 2014, at http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/where-flight-mh370/

‘Where is Flight MH370’ is one of the best documentaries I have seen on the subject and it covered most of the detail and circumstances known to the general public at this point.

However, as with almost every other commentary made to date, the programme studiously avoided reference to that four hour period immediately after the aircraft disappeared! The omission of any reference to this period was blindingly obvious and made me wonder again, why it is being avoided in the media and in any official commentary?  Perhaps it is lack of understanding as to what should have happened?

Many facts are missing, but many are available and should be released. We know that the initial period was filled with confusion and even misinformation from the airline itself which, at one stage, told Air Traffic Control that it had contact with the aircraft in Cambodian airspace. This was found to be completely incorrect and the flight had never entered Cambodian airspace.  In any case, it was not valid for the air traffic controllers to accept this information if they had not been in contact with the aircraft and had not given a clearance for it to deviate from its track.

Vietnamese Culpability?
The BBC documentary did refer, to the stunning inaction of the Vietnamese controller, in Ho Chi Minh centre, who took 17 minutes to ask the Malaysian controller why MH370 had not transferred to his radio frequency, as instructed, at the expected time when crossing the boundary from Malaysian to Vietnamese airspace.  The Vietnamese controller should have been looking for MH370 within two to three minutes of the expected transfer time.  There has not been any explanation as to why this long delay occurred, when, at that point, it was the responsibility of Ho Chi Minh ATC centre to monitor the flight. This is a serious matter and needs to be explained.  It appears to be a dereliction of duty.

An explanation is also needed as to why the controller in Kuala Lumpur did not initiate a call to Ho Chi Minh centre when he saw the MH370 data block disappear from his screen. Did he not want to know why that had occurred?  Normally it would not disappear as the secondary surveillance radar system would still show the aircraft in Vietnamese airspace.

The BBC documentary made no further reference to that apparent lack of coordination and the programme then jumped to possible scenarios, diagrams and current search activities.   Reference was made to the Malaysian military having tracked the aircraft turning back across the Malaysian peninsula, out to the Malacca Straits and then the Andaman Sea.

However, the Malaysians did not reveal this information until four days after the disappearance. The Malaysian authorities said that there had been security issues surrounding the tracking of the aircraft so they had not been able to reveal this information immediately.

We have been told that the military determined that it was a civil aircraft and, therefore, of no concern to them.  Frankly, that is absolute RUBBISH either way you look at it!

Every professional pilot and military person knows that EVERY country maintains surveillance of its airspace to the best of its technical capability.  It is public knowledge that Malaysia has a state-of-the-art military surveillance system which monitors ALL flights in its area of responsibility. The former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, who the current authorities keep trying to silence, recently stated on BBC TV that he had authorised the system to be installed whilst he was in Government.
 
So, what secret was there and what were they so protective about? What needed to be kept secret from the world even when 239 people were lost?

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In today’s aviation security environment, we expend many resources in order to secure both the airport and the aircraft. But, we have also seen that there are scenarios whereby one does not have to be in the airport or on board the aircraft in order to target civil aviation. The cyber threat is becoming increasingly well documented, but Capt. Jo Schoenmaker looks at one of the other ‘unconventional’ threats that is, perhaps, not being looked at in a substantive way given today’s security environment, namely that of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS).

On Monday 31st May 2010, Mr. E. Ratelband, a Dutch self-claimed ‘guru of positivism’, crashed a small, unmanned aircraft into one of the prime political buildings (‘De Ridderzaal’) in The Hague, The Netherlands. According to the media, his action was well planned weeks in advance. He had rented a seminar room on the top floor of the Novotel, opposite the governmental buildings and, from there, he had launched his ‘Robbe Charter’ Aircraft (weight approximately 2000 grams, propelled with a 5cc Magnum two-stroke engine, carrying 0.4 litre methanol as fuel), towing a banner with the title of his newest book. After a few circling manoeuvres over the area, he crashed his aircraft into De Ridderzaal. He claimed it to be a promotional stunt for his book.

There was, apparently, no link to terrorism, and nobody was hurt or injured. As such, it never became an international news headline, and the story and attention soon waned. However, one could argue that this revealed just how simple it can be to use an RPAS as an attack system.

The term RPAS is nowadays used as the reference for ‘Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems’ but it belongs to the wider family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), which also comprises ‘autonomous’ RPAS where no human action is necessary after take-off. ICAO uses the term UAS.

An RPAS is simply an aircraft that is designed to operate with no human pilot on board, of which there are a wide variety on the market; their size can vary from micro-UASs, of only 100 grams, to high altitude/long range RPAS of over 10,000 kg – in other words, anything from a privately owned and operated matchbox-sized flying camera to an aircraft the size of a Boeing-737 used for commercial or military purposes. The military versions are commonly referred to as ‘drones’.

RPAS is clearly a new domain all over the globe and the biggest challenge is to come up with a single set of truly global rules and regulations, taking into account matters of safety, privacy, security, environment, commerce, legal liability and insurance.

The number of RPAS, and their possible modes of application, are increasing enormously and that rise is expected to increase. Their uses vary widely from (commercial and non-commercial) photography and surveillance to transport for civil and military objectives. All sorts of entities are researching new possibilities for the use of RPAS, not only defence agencies, but also companies like DHL, UPS, Amazon (Prime Air) and Google (Project Wing) are researching the possibilities of packages being delivered right to the doorstep of the customer by an unmanned aircraft.

RPAS are becoming more and more sophisticated (or even fully automated), yet easier to use and operate. This also goes for unregulated (lightweight) RPAS in the hands of inexperienced users, keeping in mind that these systems are affordable and easy to obtain.

This all means that RPAS will increasingly utilise the same airspace as commercial civil (or general) aviation. This will not only have safety implications for the industry, like the challenge of integration of RPAS in non-segregated airspace; it will require a very thorough examination of the security ramifications of RPAS operations, related to possible security scenarios involving either regulated RPAS or unregulated RPAS in hands of private owners or, worse still, terrorists.

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The effective training of behavioural detection officers is the subject of considerable debate. The challenge each behavioural detection trainer faces is how to instruct officers to identify a broad range of behaviours, often unspecified in nature, amongst thousands of passengers. We all recognise that powers of observation alone are not enough; officers have to be able to analyse and draw conclusions as to whether or not a particular passenger has to be screened using enhanced security processes. There is no doubt that, in respect of behavioural analysis, on-the-job training is a very useful tool – one is dealing with real life and with genuine passengers with no need to simulate a threat environment. At the same time, we should not disregard the power of training in class. There is no one right way to train behavioural detection officers, but one should give consideration as to how to combine training methods. After all, we are training humans to work with humans. Alina Zela shares Riga International Airport’s approach to both embracing behavioural detection as a security methodology and developing an effective training programme to accompany it.

The issue of behavioural detection as a security solution provokes discussion on a par with the pros and cons of liquid explosive detection restrictions and/or the benefits of utilising TIP systems to improve X-ray operator performance. There are conferences and workshops organised by various agencies, to assist airports in the development of behaviour detection programmes, but despite all the concepts discussed at such events, they do not provide answers to all the questions.

One of the greatest challenges airport face is finding the right format for the training of behavioural detection officers; only a few airports undertake the creation of their own behavioural detection training programmes and integrate them within their aviation security regime. One such airport is Riga International Airport where, two years ago, we made the decision to endorse behavioural detection as a security methodology; we are now able to share with the global aviation security how we went about developing the associated training programme.

The first step in establishing any effective training course is to identify what information is essential; the second step is to choose the most effective method to deliver that information. When it comes to behavioural detection training, some specialists in the field have reached the conclusion that training people to identify lie indicators is a must. However is it so? Of course it is beneficial to detect lies, but most research on the detection of deception indicates that accurate direct lie detection is more a case of luck than reliance on particular skills. On the other hand some research has found that people more accurately detect deception if they are asked to indicate changes in behaviour. Moreover research also shows that there are no ubiquitous lie indicators; the behaviour of liars changes according to the individual. Thus, seeking changes in a person’s behaviour at the moment an act of deception is attempted could be more fruitful than seeking out specific lie indicators. According to some research, deception indicators appear when the liar experiences various emotions, such as fear or nervousness causing fidgeting.

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The world is changing faster than our own concepts. In 2015, the global economic model has become virtually unsustainable. The West is struggling under the pressure of developing countries which are trying to reduce its influence. Informal archeo-Marxist or neo-religious groups seek the collapse of Western society in order to promote their own values. Terrorism, hybridisation of a new type of warfare, is changing as rapidly as ideas. Routine protection of air transport, essential for the political stability of our societies and peacekeeping, is progressively crumbling as it drifts into mediocrity. We have now reached breaking point: the next terrorist attack will quash all faith in the system we rely on and will shatter the post-9/11 security doctrine.

What is the situation?
Politically: The security measures imposed or recommended by the ICAO all originate from the White House. The United States has adopted a dominating and precautionary vision based on the fact that 40% of world air traffic is North American and that 70% is operated by allied English-speaking countries. It is strengthened by the industrial aeronautic supremacy of the North American manufacturers, which control 50% of world market shares. The European vision of security is just as precautionary and subordinated to the American vision. These measures based on ‘political correctness’ are meaningless in countries where men and women do not have the same rights. In the rest of the world, they are vaguely tolerated when not rejected outright, or simply ignored. Numerous poor countries pretend to implement security measures, with little conviction. They simply want to keep up appearances in exchange for a few visas, subsidies and various other forms of international aid.

Doctrine: The protection of air transport, consists primarily of effective intelligence work carried out by the secret services. The rest, screening as currently implemented in airports, is merely Brownian motion. Although the bags of 2.5 billion passengers are systematically checked every year, not a single terrorist has ever been arrested at a security checkpoint whilst in the process of carrying out an attack. Worse, some have even been able to pass through the checks without being the least disturbed before committing their terrible crimes. Why? Because the screening philosophy is based on the egalitarian inspection of the bag contents, not on the passengers themselves. However, it is not the objects (even weapons) which commit the attacks or hijack aircraft, but exclusively people.

Criminology: As always, terrorists have found ways of bypassing the reactive measures set up by governments. The threat no longer comes from the outside, as was the case in past decades, but from the very inside of our societies. Terrorist networks have learned how to control their communication. Their recruitment and training strategy now focuses on those who are isolated, independent, unstable, with a criminal culture, indoctrinated, recently converted or convinced that they are the chosen ones. Their tactical methods have also evolved, becoming ever more shocking with the use of children, explosive breast prostheses or intra-corporal IEDs. Lacking the striking power of a regular army, terrorist organisations aim to destroy symbols and punish the innocent ‘non-believers’. While we continue trying to detect weapons, liquid explosives, etc. in luggage or air freight, they train and prepare to use chemical weapons in confined environments. They hatch plans for tomorrow’s war; we still speculate about yesterday’s…

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In business as in life we have constantly to review where we are, what we are doing and respond to innovation and development as and when appropriate. The priorities of safety and security require that ALL involved in the complex process of ensuring an aircraft is considered ‘secure’ and safe to depart adhere to the highest levels of discipline and process control.

In all that we do there is an inescapable need for people who have to be trusted. A significant number of people have an input into to the preparation of ‘the supplies’ to be uploaded onto an aircraft (containers, carts, boxes, ULDs, blankets, newspapers, etc.), so it surely follows that having arrived at the position where the ‘goods’ are deemed secure and suitable for loading and transportation, the aircraft must also be ‘secured’ and operated in an effective, interference-deterring manner.

Decades of sophisticated technological development have enabled us to screen most items going onboard an aircraft. Still, a key vulnerability, which may offer the opportunity to introduce prohibited items, is during the transportation of catering and duty free/onboard supplies from their packing stations to the aircraft.

Who would have thought that the industry would still be relying on plastic and metal seals, along with easy-to-compromise padlocks? Is it because there has never been an alternative that was proven to be credible, cost-effective and that would enhance existing security protocols and processes? Whatever the container, be it a cart/trolley, canister or ULD, the opportunity to remove an item of value has been exploited by organised groups and lone individuals along the supply chain.

This is a global issue rather than a local one. A recent survey conducted by the ‘Unite Here’ union in America was published by USA Today on the 9th September 2014 reporting that 1 in 4 (25%) of airline catering employees said unauthorised people could get into their kitchens and transport vehicles, and the same number warned that someone could put contraband on a food cart. This report was also submitted to the Transport Security Administration emphasising the concern of the union members.

Over the years certain initiatives have been trialled to address these problems, adding an extra level of security in an effort to offer a visible deterrent against interference. For example, STI Airline Sales & Services Ltd. (STI) – who have specialised in the area of duty free security for international airlines, catering companies and duty free/onboard retail concessionaires since 1998 – pioneered methods of added security as a defence to this serious and costly issue.

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by Philip Baum

For the past couple of days I have sat and listened to a range of speakers address a conference on topics which loosely fall under the heading of ‘aviation security’. Most of the papers presented were extremely informative and promoted industry best practice, yet I was left with the niggling feeling that something was missing…

I was exceptionally impressed by the reduction in passenger wait times quoted, the increased speed at which scanning devices could process bags, the programmes embarked upon which have raised levels of staff motivation, the research effected to evaluate the hurdles to be overcome in order to meet LAGs screening deadlines, and the quality of the data harnessed by airports and airlines on checkpoint performance. But still, why did I feel less than content with what I was hearing?

It would seem, granted the technological enhancements, the increased focus on human factors and overall greater industry cooperation, that we are taking great strides forward. But, perhaps, therein lies the problem…the definition of the word ‘forward’. We can only be making progress if we know which way we are going and what the final destination is. And, in the case of aviation security, surely that should be developing a system which reduces the number of criminal acts being perpetrated against civil aviation?

For more than a decade we have seen the industry attempt to merge the world of ‘facilitation’ with that of ‘security’. It’s all about processing passengers and making sure that we get them through the system as quickly as possible whilst meeting the mandated security requirements. As a result, we measure security checkpoints in terms of bags and/or passengers per hour, wait times, TIP scores, and percentage of random inspections performed. It’s all great data, but data that has no bearing on whether we are actually improving security. I’m all for improving many of these throughput rates. After all, I fly frequently and don’t want to be held up unnecessarily. But what I would really like to see is the checkpoint measured by numbers of interdictions. And, let me be clear, when I say interdictions, I am not referring to the identification of a passenger carrying a 125ml bottle of perfume in their carry-on baggage…a ‘find’ that is more likely to have distracted a screener from finding a genuine threat.

Fortunately we don’t have that many terrorists wandering through our checkpoints, so real hit rates are hard to use as a performance indicator. Criminal activity is, however, commonplace and it would be refreshing to see checkpoint data on, for example, the number of times an individual is reported to the police or the frequency with which airline personnel are told that a passenger might not be fit to fly. If a major international airport is not able to present such data, then either it demonstrates an inability of the screeners to identify any wrongdoers or they are identifying such persons, but are failing to seize the opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness at interdicting real threats.

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By Omer Laviv

Two major developments have the potential to completely change the nature of aviation security in the 21st century: globalisation and the information revolution. Both criminal and terrorist organisations are transcending national boundaries, and may carry out attacks at any location, extending the battlefield to the whole world.

At the same time, the free flow of information in an age of internet and mobile communications allows even small groups of perpetrators to plan and coordinate operations online, at a minimal risk of discovery. Israelis witnessed a horrifying example of the impact of globalised terrorism on 30th May 1972, when Kozo Okamoto, along with two other Japanese members of the radical leftish Japanese Red Army, landed at Lod Airport on Air France Flight 132 from Paris. They went to the passenger baggage carousel, whipped out Kalashnikov rifles and hand grenades from their luggage, and began shooting. They were able to murder twenty-six people (17 of whom were Puerto Rican pilgrims) and to wound nearly 80 more. One of the terrorists killed his comrade and then committed suicide while Kozo Okamoto, who survived, was convicted and imprisoned for life in Israel. (He was actually released in 1985 as part of a prisoner exchange with Palestinian militant factions for captive Israeli soldiers). It was claimed that the Japanese Red Army executed the attack to aid the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), hoping that in exchange, the PFLP would execute terror attacks on Japanese soil.

The combination of globalisation and the information revolution means that aviation security can no longer afford to see itself as the first line of defence in the country’s security effort. Rather, it should become the point where data from different sources converge to identify the few malefactors among the multitudes entering and leaving the country. As a consequence, intelligence forces are called upon to provide pin-point passenger alerts to customs and border police, as well as to airport security organisations, leading to the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators.

The need for early warning is also fuelled by the growing volume of world travel, and the need to handle increasingly more passengers on often shrinking budgets. There is constant pressure to expedite security controls in order to support the vital economic activities of trade and tourism, which should be balanced against the potential damage to these same sectors through security incidents, terrorist attacks and plain old crime.

Current technology and means of surveillance assist the security effort by providing an unprecedented amount of information about possible suspects. Data sources may include anything from a handshake caught on CCTV to social media comments. In fact, analyst firm IDC has predicted that, “total data will grow by 50 times by 2020 and unstructured data (video, email, files) will account for 90% of this data stream”. Yet the very wealth of information makes it difficult to see the wood for the trees and trace patterns of malicious intent among the multitude of normal behaviours and transactions.

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by Jeffrey Price and Jeffrey Forrest

The geographic concept of location and its relationship to human activity has been well established throughout recorded human history. In modern times, one of the most well-known places of varied human activity is the ‘central business district’ or CBD. Varying volume and types of activity within a CBD can stimulate demands for numerous modes of transportation and related systems. In the case of air transportation, these demands usually create a need for land use planning that co-locates airports in strategic ways to CBDs. In this traditional model, the proximity and modes of interconnecting transportation systems of the airport are driven by the demands of the CBD. However, in recent years more discussion and strategic planning is taking place that prescribes the need to establish the airport as the centre of economic activity and resulting urban infrastructure, thereby replacing the role of the CBD. This relatively new concept is being discussed and implemented globally, and is referred to as the ‘airport-centric’ development plan, or ‘aerotropolis’. Jeffrey Price and Jeffrey Forrest examine the security implications and considerations.

As potentially analogous to the CBD, the aerotropolis can also be viewed as a strategy and body of tactics for land use and development principles centred on the airport as the foci for commerce. Human activity surrounding and connected to the aerotropolis is planned and conducted in ways that gain from economies and related efficiencies offered by the central airport of a geographic region to the aerotropolis. To offer these benefits will require new ways of connecting and accessing the key airport within the aerotropolis to passengers and cargo. New policies and processes for interacting with the airport within the aerotropolis will have profound implications to traditional concerns of airport security. The implications will be further complicated in areas where the supply-chain is affected, such as off-site cargo or passenger screening.

As the commercial aviation industry and airport infrastructure developed after World War II, land use was cultivated with focus on, and connected to, the geographic area’s primary CBD. Even though airports in the U.S. typically issue master plans that include land use development strategies, much of the design of surrounding communities has been developed with little consideration to the primary airport. Part of this lack of planning is caused by the Federal Aviation Administration providing significant capital funding for airports and airport master plans, whereas many local communities do not provide capital to the airport. While community input is solicited as part of the planning process, without funding being attached to community support, the community concerns are not typically given as much weight in planning decisions. However, this absence of planning has resulted in residential encroachment too close to the airport (with related issues of noise and other environmental concerns) and less effective and efficient systems for transportation of passenger and cargo to and from the primary airport to the CBD.

In contrast to the above concerns, airport-centric philosophy of the aerotropolis is the purposeful implementation of land use and related infrastructure development that leverages the effectiveness and efficiency of the airport’s services to the surrounding industrial and residential community. Increased benefits offered by the Aerotropolis will require land use to be planned for greater connectivity to the airport – for example, more effective and efficient connectivity from the perspectives of the arriving passenger (domestic or international), the pedestrian living in adjacent areas and walking to the aerotropolis, and the local manufacturer that is trying to reduce the cost of shipping associated with the traditional ‘last mile’ escalation in operating costs. This system of enhanced access, within and connecting to the aerotropolis will place greater demands on security in order to ensure adequate levels of protection against threats.

As a centre of commerce, a situation can be foreseen where business executives may want to meet with travellers on site, at the airport. The aerotropolis concept goes beyond the traditional airport-hotel or meeting-room concept. Executives are focused on efficiencies and desire to maximise their time on site, not standing around in security lines or getting special approval to go into the sterile area for a meeting. Security personnel in the aerotropolis will have to consider how to accommodate these high-speed business interpersonal transactions.

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by Robert Bunker

The threat of body cavity bombs has been increasingly mentioned in the news over the last few years as well as having been the subject of numerous humorous cartoons in various print and web media. Questions concerning whether such bombs are pure fantasy or if they could actually work have been raised, along with the further question of whether terrorists would even consider using them if they did indeed work. Robert J. Bunker provides us with a general introduction to the subject of body cavity bombs, contraband smuggling techniques, detonation scenarios that could be utilised against airliners, and related themes of interest. He also evaluates the validity of those predictions which indicate the use of such devices might form part of future al Qaeda tactics, techniques, and procedures.

For a number of decades now, a cat and mouse – offensive and defensive – dynamic has been playing out globally between terrorists, specifically those groups utilising suicide bombers, and security professionals. This dynamic has been focused on suicide bombers attempting to attack high value targets. Each time these targets, e.g. VIPs, facilities, or airliners, become further hardened by the defending authorities, some sort of terrorist innovation (counter-counter-measure) has taken place in order to get around the new counter-measures put into place.

This action-reaction dynamic can initially be seen with the shift in terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) from standard suicide bombs utilising military explosives and fragmentation to non-fragmentation/non-standard explosives (such as TATP – hydrogen peroxide derived). Further iterations included bombs disguised as benign objects, bombs sealed so as not to give off explosive vapours, and bombs migrating closer and closer to the human body – away from satchels and external vests to bra, underwear, and ankle bombs that are more covert in nature. Further evolution includes shoe and drink-based (utilising liquid explosives) devices.

At some point in this evolutionary process, terrorist groups only had a limited number of options available to them to overcome the layers of new countermeasures security professionals had devised (e.g. metal detectors, X-raying of carry-on items, shoe scans, explosive residue detection, and limits on liquids). These options were explosive clothing, medical cast concealments, the wearing of an external (cast or mould) belly, prosthetics, or the use of under-fat roll, colostomy bags, or body cavities.

After analysing these various options, it was concluded that only the body cavity option really made proper tactical sense, especially since the precedent already existed for the smuggling of contraband into high security environments (into prisons and onto airliners) within the body.

Contraband Smuggling Techniques
The three primary means to internally smuggle contraband in the human body – typically high value illicit narcotics such as cocaine and heroin – are either by ingesting packets which are then carried in the stomach and intestines, by inserting a packet into the rectum, or by inserting a packet into the vagina. In all cases, the packet(s) must have a fluid barrier of some sort and, in the case of ingestion, be robust enough not to be broken down by digestive acids.
A second tier of internal human body smuggling is derived from surgical procedures to place packets of contraband (solids or liquids) in the thighs, around the belly, or within female breasts.

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